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THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW
JERSEY AND ITS IMPACT ON OUR NATION'S
"EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY"
Aaron Scherzer*
In 2007, New Jersey became the first state in over forty years to abolish the death
penalty legislatively. Twenty-five years earlier, in 1982, New Jersey had followed a
state-level trend by reinstating its death penalty. However, during the twenty-five
years between reinstatement and abolition, New Jersey did not conduct a single
execution. Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed numerous death penalty
cases and consistently narrowed the dass of cases eligible for the death penalty.
This Note posits that the supreme court's narrowing of eligible cases was one of the
factors that prevented executions from taking place in New Jersey. The Note further
hypothesizes that this lack of executions created the policy space for legislative
abolition. The Note then explores the effect that New Jersey's abolition might have
on capital punishment in other states, as well as the potential influence of state-level
abolition on the United States Supreme Court's evaluation of the constitutionality
of the death penalty.
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"The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man.... The Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society. "'
INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 2007, New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine signed
legislation abolishing the death penalty in New Jersey.2 With that action,
New Jersey became the first state in more than four decades to abolish
the death penalty through the legislative process.3
The story of the abolition of the death penalty in New Jersey begins
not with the passage of repeal legislation in 2007, but with the period
1. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
2. An Act to Eliminate the Death Penalty and Allow for Life Imprisonment
Without Eligibility for Parole, Pub. L. No. 2007, c. 204 5 1 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 2008)). The Act replaced the death penalty with life in prison
without parole. Id.; see discussion infra Part VI. Corzine concurrently commuted the sen-
tences of the eight inmates on New Jersey's death row to life in prison without parole.
Jeremy W Peters, Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes Sentences of Eight,
N.YTIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at B3.
3. West Virginia and Iowa legislatively abolished the death penalty in their states in
1965. Robert Schwaneberg, Stage is Set for Fight Over Death Penalty, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
NJ.), Dec. 2, 2007, at 25. However, until New Jersey's abolition, no state had legislatively
abolished the death penalty since the Supreme Court upheld three death state penalty stat-
utes in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see infra note 33. After Gregg, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, and NewYork ended their death penalty regimes, but they did so judicially.
In 1979, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Rhode Island's death penalty statute
was unconstitutional. State v. Cline, 397 A.2d 1309 (R.I. 1979). The statute provided for
the death penalty only for prisoners who committed murder while already in prison;
however in those cases, the death penalty was mandatory. Id. at 1311. The court held that
the mandatory imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional in light of the United
States Supreme Court's jurisprudence on mandatory death sentences. Id. Five years later,
the Legislature officially removed the death penalty from the murder statute, and attempts
to reinstate the death penalty in Rhode Island have never succeeded. Office of the Secre-
tary of State, Abolishing [sic] of the Death Penalty in Rhode Island (Oct. 11, 2000),
http://www.sec.state.ri.us/library/riinfo/abolishing-of-the-death-penalty-in-rhode-island. In
1984, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared the state's death penalty stat-
ute unconstitutional. Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984). The
statute allowed for the imposition of the death penalty if the defendant was convicted of
murder, but not if the defendant pled guilty to murder; the court found that this in-
fringed on the right against self-incrimination and the right to a jury trial. Id. at 118. In
2004, the New York Court of Appeals, quoting an earlier New Jersey Supreme Court
decision, found that the NewYork jury deadlock instruction in capital cases was unduly
coercive and therefore unconstitutional. People v. LaValle 817 N.E.2d. 341, 361 (N.Y
2004) (quoting State v. White, 142 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1958)). Legislative efforts to solve this
constitutional infirmity have been unsuccessful. NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY
COMMISSION, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 39 (2007),
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc-final.pdf.
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shortly after the death penalty's reinstatement in New Jersey in 1982. It
was five years later, in 1987, before the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
viewed its first death penalty case after the reinstatement. But, from 1987
to 1992, the court overturned nearly every death penalty case it re-
viewed.4 Thus, by 1992, the court had communicated to prosecutors in
the state that it would narrowly interpret the death penalty statute.
Throughout the twenty years of post-reinstatement death penalty juris-
prudence in New Jersey, the court overturned nearly eighty percent of
the death penalty cases it reviewed.6 In doing so, the court made clear that
it would not take an "expansive" reading of New Jersey's death penalty
statute. Instead, the court used its powers to narrow the class of cases that
were eligible for the death penalty.8
As other scholars and journalists have noted, the abolition of the
death penalty in New Jersey was the result of several factors: a strong
and fully funded public defender's office committed to fighting every
death penalty case, 9 jurors who appeared reluctant to impose the death
penalty,'° and prosecutors who recognized the strong possibility of
4. From 1987 to 1992, the court overturned thirty-three out of the thirty-four
death sentences it reviewed. The only case upheld was that of Robert Marshall. See infra
note 47. From 1992 through 2007, the court continued to overturn the majority of death
penalty cases it reviewed. See infra note 6.
5. By the early 1990s, the prosecutorial charging decisions had dropped dramati-
cally. See discussion infra note 16.
6. For a full list of death penalty cases in New Jersey after 1982, see Appendix,
Table 1. The exact figure depends on how cases that were reviewed twice are counted and
how one counts the three men who died while incarcerated on death row. See also Jeffrey
Fagan, Testimony to the New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission 5 (Oct. 11, 2006)
(transcript on file with Michigan Journal of Race & Law) (detailing the reversal rate for cases
that the court reviewed before 1997 and after 1997; when Fagan's numbers are added
together, the reversal rate is seventy-nine percent).
7. Telephone Interview with John Redden, Former Prosecutor (Mar. 18, 2008)
(transcript on file with Michigan Journal of Race & Law). In his twenty-year prosecutorial
career, John Redden was an Assistant Prosecutor, Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, and
Chief Assistant Prosecutor in Essex and Morris counties. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See, e.g., Editorial, The Difference, N.J. LAw., Jan. 14, 2008, at 6 (citing the strength
of the Office of the Public Defender as one of the differences between the death penalty
administration in New Jersey and Texas). There were 228 capital cases tried after the rein-
statement of the death penalty in New Jersey; approximately 180 of those cases were tried by
the New Jersey Public Defender's Office and juries returned verdicts of death in only 20% of
those 180 cases. W Michael Murphy et al., Panel I: The Struggle in the Courtroom, 33 SErON
HALL LEGIS.J. 69, 75 (2008) (remarks of Dale E.Jones). Overall,juries returned a verdict of
death in 60 of the 228 death penalty cases (approximately 26%). NEw JERSEY DETH PENALTY
STUDY COMMISSION, Supra note 3, at 7.
10. Claudia Van Wyk, Attorney, Presentation to the Death Penalty Study Commis-
sion on Behalf of New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the Death Penalty 2, 7 tbl.1 (Oct. 11,
2006) (transcript on file with Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
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having a death penalty verdict reversed upon appeal." In addition, as
with any important legislative action, the bill had the support of key
political actors. There was a strong grassroots movement against the
death penalty,' 2 and Senator Raymond Lesniak, the primary co-sponsor
of the bill, was a politically powerful state senator renowned for his leg-
islative prowess.13
This Note will fill a gap in the literature by closely examining the
way that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions influenced the pros-
pects for abolition. Those decisions consistently narrowed the class of cases
that were death-eligible in New Jersey. While the New Jersey Supreme
Court was not the sole reason for the legislative repeal,' 4 the court's nar-
11. See discussion infra Part IV
12. See, e.g., Robert. J. Martin, Raymond J. Lesniak, & Celeste Fitzgerald, Legislative
Resolution Presented To Celeste Fitzgerald for the NewJerseyansfor Alternatives to the Death Pen-
alty, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 133 (2008) ("The Senate of the State of New Jersey is
pleased to salute Celeste Fitzgerald ... in grateful recognition of her exemplary efforts in
winning public and political support for the elimination of the death penalty in the State
of New Jersey.").
13. Joe Donohue, Crusader Gets His Fight Back: Statehouse Vet Has More Influence Than
Ever, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 7, 2008, at 13. Notably, Senator Lesniak had voted
for the original death penalty bill in 1982. RAYMOND J. LESNIAK, THE ROAD TO ABOLITION:
How NEW JERSEY ABOLISHED THE DEATH PENALTY 9 (2008).
14. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court did not overturn the death penalty, it
did play an important role in abolition.While this paper will not discuss in detail the rela-
tive merits of legislative versus judicial repeal of the death penalty, it is worth briefly
recognizing the arguments on both sides. Scholars disagree about the costs and benefits of
court-imposed social policy changes, and whether court-driven social changes result in an
undesirable backlash that should be avoided. Compare William N. Eskridge,Jr., Pluralism and
Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy By Lowering the Stakes of Politics 114 YALE LJ.
1279, 1310 (2005) (arguing that in some cases "[j]udicial review can raise the stakes of
politics by taking issues away from the political system prematurely") with Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 373, 409-424 (2007) (presenting a more positive account of backlash as a means of
affirming the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution and arguing that legislative
change can also create backlash). It is also unclear whether legislative or judicial repeal is
more permanent. In a state without judicial elections, see infra note 46, judicial repeal
might be longer-lasting. But the notion that judicial repeal is longer-lasting is less likely to
hold true in those states where judicial elections can replace supreme court justices. How-
ever, as David Ruhnke, a veteran capital defense lawyer, recently pointed out, New Jersey's
legislative abolition means that the state is "one election and one shocking crime away
from the death penalty being brought back or being put back on the table in New Jersey."
Murphy et al., supra note 9, at 84 (remarks of David A. Ruhnke). Ironically, while legisla-
tive enactments might normally be prone to quicker reversal than court rulings of
unconstitutionality, New Jersey's Governor-elect, Chris Christie, will have the opportunity
to reshape the New Jersey Supreme Court. Christie will be able to appoint up to four
new justices in his first term. Mary Fuchs, Supreme Court's Future in Hands of Next Gover-
nor, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 29, 2009, at 1. However, Christie has pledged not to
overturn the sixty-year old "gentleman's agreement" on the composition of the court;
traditionally there are no more than four Democrats or four Republicans on the seven-
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row reading of the death penalty statute was one of the primary reasons
that New Jersey did not execute anyone after the death penalty was rein-
stated.'5
This narrowing of cases eligible for the death penalty sent a signal to
prosecutors that the New Jersey Supreme Court would uphold the death
penalty in only the most extreme cases. Prosecutors reacted to the su-
preme court's message; the percent of death-eligible cases brought to a
penalty trial decreased from 57% in the 1980s to 18% in the 1990s, 16 even
though New Jersey's rate of death-eligible homicides remained steady.1
7
The New Jersey Supreme Court's reversals and the prosecutorial charging
decisions contributed to the lack of executions under New Jersey's rein-
stated death penalty statute. 8
The absence of any executions in New Jersey over a forty-four year
time span was one of the most important factors that drove the New Jer-
sey Legislature to abolish the death penalty. This absence allowed
opponents of the death penalty to argue that the death penalty's potential
benefits of retribution, deterrence, and closure were significantly out-
weighed by the effects of the state's protracted death penalty process. That
process re-victimized victim's families and imposed high financial burdens
on the state. 9 In addition, as with any death penalty regime, there was
20always the possibility that the state might execute an innocent person.
After weighing the costs and benefits, the New Jersey Death Penalty
Study Commission, along with some prosecutors, victims' families, and
state senators who had previously sponsored death penalty enactment
member court at any given time. Id. For further discussion of Governor-elect Christie's
position on the death penalty in New Jersey, see infra note 191.
15. See, e.g., James R. Zazzali, et al., Panel II: The Death Penalty on Appeal: Constitu-
tionality, Equality, and Proportionality Review, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 95, 97 (2008) (remarks
of Alan B. Handler) ("I think we can also conclude that ... the court's decisional results
have certainly become a part of the ingredients that have brought about the opposition to
capital punishment and the decision to abandon it."). In fact, New Jersey had not executed
anyone since 1963. Dana E. Sullivan, 361 Executions Later, NJ'S Death Penalty Faces Death,
NJ. LAw., Nov. 16, 2007, at 1.
16. Van Wyk, supra note 10, at 8 tbl.2.
17. Id. at 2, 8 tbl.2.
18. See infra Parts II & IV.
19. See Mary E. Forsberg, Money for Nothing?: The Financial Costs of New Jersey's
Death Penalty (2005), http://www.njpp.org/rpt__moneyfornothing.html (estimating that
the State had spent $253 million on the death penalty since 1982); NEW JERSEY DEATH
PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 34 (The Commission found that the "intan-
gible emotional and psychological costs [including re-victimization of victims' families]
must also be taken into consideration in weighing the costs of the death penalty."). See also
discussion infra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
20. NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 51 ("The pe-
nological interest in executing a small number of persons guilty of murder is not
sufficiently compelling to justify the risk of making an irreversible mistake."). See discus-
sion infra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
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bills, concluded that the state was actually better off having life without
parole as its most severe penalty.
21
Death penalty opponents and public defenders also acknowledge
that the fact that no one had been executed in New Jersey for forty-four
years was an important factor leading to the abolition of the death penalty.
As Celeste Fitzgerald, Director of New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the
Death Penalty said, the lack of executions in New Jersey created the "pol-
icy space" for the grassroots movement and political realities that led to
abolition. Joseph Krakora, Assistant New Jersey Public Defender and
Director of Capital and Special Litigation further noted that the "death
23
penalty never became routine" in New Jersey.
Instead, since every death penalty case received "incredible scrutiny
from the supreme court," it was a "big deal" each time a jury imposed a
death sentence and even more noteworthy when the supreme court up-
held a sentence. 4 As former New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Peter
Verniero wrote, "[b]ecause death is an irreversible penalty, the state
[s]upreme [c]ourt has construed the judicial role in capital cases as requir-
ing heightened and exact scrutiny. '  This close judicial scrutiny
contributed to the lack of executions in New Jersey. And this Note hy-
pothesizes that the lack of executions in New Jersey played an important
role in the state's abolition of the death penalty.
New Jersey is not the only state where the infrequency of execu-
tions could play a role in abolition debates. Thus, the importance of the
abolition of the death penalty in New Jersey extends beyond its borders.
The lessons from New Jersey are especially relevant for the twelve other
states that have death penalty statutes but rarely conduct executions.
26
Many of the arguments made by the New Jersey Death Penalty Study
Commission may be persuasive in those twelve states as well. In fact, simi-
lar arguments have already prevailed in New Mexico, a state that had
executed only one person since reinstating the death penalty in 1979. On
March 19, 2009, New Mexico followed New Jersey's lead and became the
21. NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 2. See discus-
sion infra PartsV &VI.
22. Telephone Interview with Celeste Fitzgerald, Dir., New Jerseyans for Alterna-
tives to the Death Penalty (Mar. 7, 2008) (transcript on file with Michigan Journal of Race &
Law).
23. Telephone Interview with Joseph Krakora, Assistant Pub. Defender and Director
of Capital and Special Litigation (N.J.), (Mar. 11, 2008) (transcript on file with Michigan
Journal of Race & Law).
24. Id.
25. PeterVerniero, Op-Ed., Appealed to Death, N.YTIMES,Jan. 14, 2007, at A15.
26. These twelve states have executed three or fewer people since 1976. Death Pen-
alty Information Center, Executions in the United States, 1608-1976, by State, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=1110 (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). See
discussion infra note 165.
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second state in nearly forty-five years to abolish the death penalty legisla-
tively.
21
Executions are increasingly concentrated in a few states. Only nine
states executed anyone in 2008; ten states have conducted an execution in
2009.28 Looking to the future, if those twelve states that still have the
death penalty on the books but have rarely executed anyone were to
eliminate the death penalty, they would join the fifteen states that have
already abolished the death penalty. This abolition would leave only
twenty-three states with the death penalty on the books, and executions
would likely continue to be concentrated in a small number of even these
states.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated
that its definition of cruel and unusual punishment in capital punishment
cases will be influenced by state-level developments.2 9 Thus, a consistent
state-level trend moving away from the death penalty could lead the Su-
preme Court to overturn the death penalty as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
I.THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEw JERSEY BEFORE ITS REPEAL
Prior to 1972, when the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the death penalty was unconstitutional as it had been applied in the cases
before the Court,30 361 people had been executed in New Jersey.3 '
27. Dan Boyd, Repealed: Richardson Signs Bill Abolishing Death Penalty in NM., AL-
BUQU'ERQUE J., March 19, 2009. See discussion infra PartVII. See discussion infra note 165.
28. See Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State and Region
Since 1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=186 (last visited Oct. 1,
2009).
29. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005);Atkins v.Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002); Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 782 (1982). See discussion infra PartVII.
30. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).The Court issued a one paragraph per
curiam opinion declaring that the "imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in
these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments." Id. at 239-40 (emphasis added). All nine Justices wrote separate
opinions, five concurring in the judgment and four dissenting from the per curiam opin-
ion.Justices Brennan and Marshall would have found the death penalty unconstitutional in
all instances. However, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White found only that the death
penalty had been arbitrarily applied.Three of the Justices noted the role that race placed in
determining those defendants sentenced to death. See id. at 249-253 (Douglas,J., concur-
ring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart noted that the death penalty had been "wantonly and ... freakishly imposed." Id.
at 310 (Stewart,J., concurring).
31. Sullivan, supra note 15.These 361 executions put New Jersey among the fifteen
states that had carried out the most executions since 1608, even though no one had been
executed in the state since 1963. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 26. Among
those executed was Bruno Hauptmann. Hauptmann was sentenced to death for killing
Charles Lindbergh's baby. The prosecutor in his trial was David Wilentz; Wilentzs son
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Five months before Furman v. Georgia, the New Jersey Supreme
Court had overturned the New Jersey death penalty statute based on its
denial to some defendants of the right to a jury trial.32 After the United
States Supreme Court reiterated that the death penalty was not per se
unconstitutional and upheld the death penalty statutes of three states,33 the
New Jersey Legislature considered numerous bills to reinstate the death
penalty in New Jersey. The legislature passed two death penalty bills in the
late 1970s, but both were vetoed by Governor Brendan Byrne. 4 After
Governor Tom Kean took office in 1982, the legislature passed another
death penalty bill. Governor Kean signed the bill into law on August 6,
1982.3s The death penalty statute allowed for the imposition of the death
penalty if, in a separate penalty proceeding, the jury unanimously found
that all of the aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt.36 The aggravating factors included cases involving a
grave risk of death to multiple victims; the murder of a public servant; an
offense committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission
of, or an attempt to commit ... robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or
kidnapping; or a murder that was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman."37 The mitigating factors included: that the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; the age
of the defendant at the time of the crime; if the defendant had no signifi-
cant prior criminal record; or "any other factor which is relevant to the
defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.'"38
The statute also provided that capital cases would be subject to automatic
Robert would later become ChiefJustice of a New Jersey Supreme Court that overturned
the vast majority of the death penalty sentences that came before it. Sullivan, supra note 15.
32. State v. Funicello, 286 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1972). Under the then-existing death pen-
alty legislation, a defendant who did not contest the charges (by pleading non vult
contendere) faced a maximum of life imprisonment, while a defendant who contested the
charges was eligible for the death penalty. In Funicello, the court found that this exacted an
unconstitutional penalty on those who sought a jury trial. Id. at 67.
33. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). In these five cases, all decided on July 2,
1976, the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas,
but overturned the death penalty statutes of Louisiana and North Carolina. The Supreme
Court established minimum procedures for the imposition of the death penalty while
making clear that states could not impose a mandatory death sentence for first-degree
murder (as Louisiana and North Carolina's statutes did).
34. Governor Byrne pocket-vetoed the first bill by refusing to act on the bill; he
outright vetoed the second bill. Byrne Says Death-Penalty Veto Can Be Opposed, N.Y TiMEs,
June 14,1978, at NJ25.
35. Joseph F Sullivan, Death Penalty Bill Signed by Kean, He Calls for Execution by
Injection, N.Y.TtMEs,Aug. 7, 1982, at 1.




The Abolition of the Death Penalty in New Jersey
review by the New Jersey Supreme Court.39 Capital cases bypassed the
intermediate appellate courts and went directly to the New Jersey Su-
preme Court; this required the supreme court to closely consider every
aspect of the death penalty proceeding.40 The statute also mandated that
the New Jersey Supreme Court conduct "proportionality review," which
required the court to compare the case with the sentences imposed in
similar death-eligible cases. 41 Although the statute was amended several
times, this statute was still in place when the death penalty was repealed in
2007.
II.THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS OVERTURNING
DEATH PENALTY CASES
After the death penalty's reinstatement, supporters of capital pun-
ishment argued that the New Jersey Supreme Court would do anything
to avoid upholding a death sentence.42 The court, however, argued that
the New Jersey Constitution required it to ensure both reliability and
consistency in the imposition of the death penalty. The court also made
clear that it viewed the New Jersey Constitution's protections against
cruel and unusual punishment to be broader than those of the U.S. Con-
stitution.43 The court's first decision reviewing the death penalty
legislation concluded that while the United States Supreme Court "may
have departed from the vigorous enforcement of these constitutional
principles ... we are not obliged to follow the reasoning of all these
United States Supreme Court decisions in interpreting our own state
constitutional protections, nor do we intend to.
44
Some observers thought that the New Jersey Supreme Court would
declare the New Jersey death penalty unconstitutional when it first re-
viewed the revised statute in 1987; s but the court declined to do so and
continued to uphold the constitutionality of the statute in subsequent
challenges. Instead, the court demonstrated that it would vigorously
39. § 2C:11-3(e). The New Jersey Constitution set up a scheme whereby appeals
could be taken to the Supreme Court in "capital causes." N.J. CONsT. art. VI, § 5.
40. § 2C:11-3(e). SeeTelephone Interview withJoseph Krakora,supra note 23.
41. § 2C:11-3(e).
42. Joseph E Sullivan, New Jersey's Death Penalty: Fair or Fake?, N.Y Tims, Sept. 13,
1990, at B1 (quoting Neil Cooper, Hunterdon prosecutor: "This showed that the [s]upreme
[c]ourt was going every which way to nullify the death penalty."). On the other hand, former
New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Alan Handler has argued that "it would be wrong to
think the court in any actual or supplemental way had any mindset or agenda or sense that
their opposition to capital punishment influenced their decisions or brought about its ulti-
mate demise." Zazzali et al., supra note 15, at 96 (remarks ofAlan B. Handler).
43. State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 221 (NJ. 1987).
44. Id.
45. Zazzali et al., supra note 15, at 108-09 (remarks ofJames Smith).
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enforce constitutional protections by limiting the applicability of the
death penalty.4 6 The court overturned thirty-three of the first thirty-four
death penalty convictions it reviewed in the ten years following the death
penalty's reinstatement.4' A number of the death sentence reversals were
based on faulty jury instructions and other procedural violations. The
court also overturned cases in which trial judges had instructed juries that
were deadlocked on the appropriate penalty to continue their delibera-
tions; these trial judges had also emphasized to the jury the importance of• 48
reaching a unanimous verdict.
46. It is important to note that New Jersey is one of only eleven states where judges
are "never subjected to election at any time in their judicial careers." See Stephen B. Bright
& Patrick J. Keenan,Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the
Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 776 (1995). Death penalty affirmance
rates vary dramatically amoug state supreme courts according to the manner of judicial
selection. Scholars have concluded that "nationally there is a close correlation between the
method of selection of a state supreme court and that court's affirmance rate in death
penalty appeals." Id. at 766. It is difficult to isolate whether this is mere correlation or
whether the method ofjudicial selection plays a causal role. It is entirely possible, however,
that the method of selection influences a court's willingness to impose the death penalty.
47. The one exception in the first thirty-four cases was the case of Robert 0. Mar-
shall. See State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85 (N.J. 1991).The exception was consistent with the
notion that the New Jersey Supreme Court would limit the application of the death pen-
alty to the most clear-cut cases. Marshall was convicted of arranging the 1986 murder of
his wife. Marshall's conviction was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1991.
Id. at 208. There were several theories as to why the court upheld the case. The first was
that this was a case with clear premeditated intent because of the defendant's debt, the life
insurance policies he had taken out on his wife's life, and the alleged payments that the
defendant had made to have his wife killed. Joseph F Sullivan, New Jersey's High Court
Upholds Death Sentence After Blocking 26, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 25, 1991, at A1.The second the-
ory, advanced by Professor Frank Askin of Rutgers Law School, argued that Marshall "was
a case of a middle-class defendant, with resources, who had every opportunity to put for-
ward his best defense .... It was the best case for the court to uphold because it could not
be attacked as an example of discrimination by the criminal-justice system or a jury." Id.
The third theory was articulated by New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Wilentz,
who said of the case,"I would think the obvious conclusion would be,'Finally, a case came
before the court that it felt met its standards'. .. . And that's what it was."Jan Hoffman, His
Court, His Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at NJ1. However, in 2004, a federal district
court overturned Marshall's sentence because the court found that Marshall had received
ineffective assistance of counsel during the death penalty phase of his trial. Marshall v.
Hendricks, 313 F Supp. 2d 423 (D.N.J. 2004).This decision was upheld by the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 (3rd Cir. 2005). The Ocean
County prosecutor's office declined to retry the sentencing phase of Mr. Marshall's convic-
tion because of the "seemingly endless appeal process .. .and the time that has passed since
his 1986 conviction." Richard G. Jones, Legal Saga Ends for Man Who Hired Wife's Killer,
N.Y TIMES, May 13, 2006, at B5. Twenty years after his initial conviction, Marshall was
sentenced to life in prison.Jonathan Miller, Man Who Had His Wife Killed Gets a New Sen-
tence: Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at B2.
48. See State v. Hunt, 558 A.2d 1259 (N.J. 1989); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188
(NJ. 1987).
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Other reversals were based on the jury's weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors; the court determined that the jury must unanimously
agree on aggravating factors, but need not unanimously agree on mitigat-
ing factors.49 The court held that "[a]lthough the Act does not expressly
require the jury to be unanimous in finding the existence of an aggravat-
ing factor or factors, the lack of unanimity suggests that the factor has not
been established beyond a reasonable doubt" as required by the statute.'s
For mitigating factors, the court found the legislative history of the statute
inconclusive. But, the court decided that the logic of the act, which gave
the defendant the burden of production but not the burden of proof for
mitigating factors, dictated that "the [1]egislature intended that jurors need
not unanimously find the existence of a mitigating factor.""s Instead, the
court determined that after aggravating factors were determined unani-
mously, each juror would have to conduct his or her own weighing
process to determine if aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors.
If even one juror found that aggravating factors did not outweigh mitigat-
ing factors, the jury could not impose death.52 The New Jersey Supreme
Court had put a gloss on the statute expanding the protections for capital
defendants.
A. Intent to Kill
Perhaps the most controversial death penalty reversals were those
overturned under the rule established in State v. Gerald.13 In Gerald, the
court further narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants. Although
the death penalty statute allowed for the death penalty when the defen-
dant had purposely or knowingly caused either death, or serious bodily
injury resulting in death, 4 the court unanimously held that only the for-
mer, purposely or knowingly causing death, merited the death penalty."
Even though neither party raised the issue on appeal, the court found that
the issue demanded consideration in order to ensure "a just resolution of
49. State v. Bey, 548 A.2d 887, 906 (NJ. 1988). The New Jersey Supreme Court
cited the United States Supreme Court's decision two months earlier in Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367 (1988), that a jury need not unanimously find a mitigating factor; instead,
each juror should be "permitted to engage in the weighing process." Bey, 548 A.2d at 906.
50. Bey, 548 A.2d at 905.The death penalty statute the court was applying stated, at
that time, that "[i]f the jury or the court finds that any aggravating factors exist and that all
of the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all of the mitigating factors,
the court shall sentence the defendant to death:" NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(3)(a) (West
Supp. 1986).
51. Bey, 548 A.2d at 905.
52. Id. at 906.
53. 549 A.2d 792 (NJ. 1988).
54. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a)(1)-(2) (West 1982).
55. Gerald, 549 A.2d at 807. Three justices signed separate opinions but joined with
the majority in its main holding and all of the portions of the opinion discussed here.
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this appeal. ' 6 The court made clear that its holding was based on state
constitutional grounds. 7 This was necessary because the court recognized,
and discussed at length, the fact that the Supreme Court's decision in Ti-
son v. Arizona"' would allow the death penalty for defendants such as
Gerald who had been "recklessly indifferent to human life.'5 9 The court
explicitly held that the state constitution's prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishment"°  provided greater protection than the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.' State v. Gerald sent a clear message
that the supreme court would limit the applicability of the death penalty
to the most serious crimes even if the statutory language allowed for capi-
tal punishment in a broader category of cases. The New Jersey Supreme
Court also cited the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition that in capital
cases, as well as in other constitutional contexts, the states "are free to pro-
vide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal
Constitution requires.,
62
In Gerald's trial, the jury had not specified whether it found the de-
fendant guilty of causing serious bodily injury resulting in death as
opposed to purposely or knowingly causing death. The court found that
it was "possible" based on the record before the court, that the jury could
have found that the defendant "had the purpose or knowledge to cause
only serious bodily injury but not death. 63 As a remedy, the court did not
just reverse the sentencing phase of the trial. Instead, the court ordered an
entirely new trial. 4
Therefore, essentially all trials post-Gerald would need to include a
jury instruction explaining that there was a difference between intent to
kill and intent to cause serious bodily injury. As the court later explicitly
held in State v. Coyle:
56. Id. The court had previously demonstrated its willingness to consider factors not
raised by either party on appeal because it determined "[i]n no proceeding is it more im-
perative to be assured that the outcome is fair than in [capital] cases." State v. Biegenwald,
524A.2d 130, 156 (N.J. 1987).
57. Gerald, 549 A.2d at 807.
58. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
59. Gerald, 549 A.2d at 810.The prosecutors alleged that Gerald had stomped on the
defendant's face numerous times during the course of a burglary. Id. at 823.The defendant
admitted that he had punched the victim several times but denied stomping on him. Id. at
803. The court found that "[diefendant's conduct in this case appears (or so a jury could
find) to fall within the Tison category of nonintentional [sic] murders that manifest a reck-
less indifference to human life." Id. at 810.
60. NJ. CONST. art. 1, § 12 ("Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be in-
flicted.").
61. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). See Gerald, 549 A.2d at 811.
62. Id. at 810 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983)).
63. Id. at 807.
64. Id.
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[I]f the record provides a rational basis for a jury to convict a
defendant of either purposely or knowingly causing death, or
purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury that re-
sults in death, a court must instruct the jury to specify which,
if any, of those findings forms the basis for a conviction.6'
The court found that to allow the death penalty in cases where the
defendant only intended serious bodily injury but death did occur was
"grossly disproportionate.' 66 Defendants who had the same intent but
whose victims did not die would not be subject to the death penalty. As
the court held, "the actor's conduct, mental state, and intended result in
both instances are virtually identical, the victim's fortuitous survival in
one case and unfortunate demise in the other cannot provide an adequate
basis for subjecting one actor to a term of imprisonment and executing
the other."
67
The court considered overturning only the sentencing phase of the
trial, but rejected that course of action, deciding that to do so would es-
sentially "be asking a second jury to accept-indeed, to be bound by-
the findings of the first jury but then guess at precisely what the first jury
meant. Such a piecemeal approach to guilt-innocence is unacceptable as a
general proposition in any criminal prosecution."
6 8
The supreme court went on to apply the Gerald test to a number of
cases from 1988 to 1992.69 Even if the defendant's intent seemed clear, the
court overturned death penalty convictions that did not include an ex-
press jury finding of intent to kill. The case arising out of Gerald that
raised the most public uproar was State v. Harvey.70 In that case, the victim
was killed after pressure had been applied to her neck for an hour, and
after being struck fifteen times with a blunt object. The defendant con-
fessed to the crime, although he admitted only to hitting the victim once
in the head with a "hammer-like object."7' Harvey's trial had taken place
before State v. Gerald was decided and before the explicit ruling in State v.
65. 574 A.2d 951,958 (NJ. 1990) (citing Gerald, 549 A.2d at 819).
66. Gerald, 549 A.2d at 816.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 807 (emphasis in original).
69. See, e.g., State v. Erazo, 594 A.2d 232, 240 (NJ. 1991) (victim was "slashed" sev-
eral times); State v.Jackson, 572 A.2d 607 (N.J. 1990) (victim was stabbed 53 times); State
v. Pennington, 575 A.2d 816 (NJ. 1990) (victim was shot); State v. Clausell, 580 A.2d 221
(NJ. 1990) (victim was shot); State v. Harvey, 581 A.2d 483 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
932 (N.J. 1991) (victim was bludgeoned to death).The trials in these cases occurred before
the supreme court decided Gerald; because of that, the jury instructions did not include a
distinction between intent to cause serious bodily injury and intent to cause death.
70. 581 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1990). The resulting uproar was noted by Claudia Van Wyk.
Telephone Interview with Claudia Van Wyk, Attorney (Mar. 4, 2008) (transcript on file
with Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
71. Harvey, 581 A.2d at 485.
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Coyle that jury instructions must contain specific findings of intent to kill.
As a result, the trial court did not employ those jury instructions. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that "although it might seem probable
that the jury had intentional murder in mind," if there was any rational
basis for the jury to find serious-bodily-injury murder, and the jury had
not made a specific finding on intent, the case must be reversed and re-
manded for a new trial 2 In the new trial, the jury, as finder of fact, would
be properly instructed and then make its own determination as to the
intent to kill. 3 All seven justices agreed that Harvey's death sentence
should be overturned on this ground. Just as in the other cases in the Ge-
rald line, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, a
much more drastic step than simply reversing the death sentence and re-
manding for re-sentencing.
Public disapproval had been growing more vocal as the New Jersey
Supreme Court overturned thirty-three of the first thirty-four death pen-
alty cases it reviewed. To some state leaders, the outcome in State v. Harvey
was particularly galling. The court's decision in Harvey led the state's At-
torney General, Robert J. Del Tufo, to issue a public statement declaring
that "[i]f the court's underlying message is that it philosophically objects
to the death penalty, then it is time to eliminate the charade and to reas-
sess directly and expressly the continued death penalty in the state."74
Criticism of the Gerald line of cases was so intense that the court
took the rare step of acknowledging the public outcry: "Although we
have often visited this issue, there has been a persistent misapprehension
that in the process we are second-guessing juries about the jury's finding
of intent. The public obviously does not understand what we are doing."7'
72. Id. at 486.
73. Id.
74. Joseph F Sullivan, Is Court Killing Death Penalty In New Jersey? N.Y. TMEs, Dec.
1, 1990, at 27.
75. State v. Dixon, 593 A.2d 266 (N.J. 1991).The court went on to defend its Gerald
line of cases as consistent with the legislative history of the death penalty law, which indi-
cated that the death penalty was meant to apply only to first-degree murder. The court
noted that at common law there was a distinction between first- and second-degree mur-
der: first-degree murder applied only if the defendant had intent to kill. Prior to the
reinstatement of the death penalty, the New Jersey Criminal Code had only one penalty
for murder (30 years imprisonment), and therefore there was no need to distinguish be-
tween the two types of murder. When the death penalty was reinstated in 1982, the law
had simply been attached to the already-existing criminal code, which did not establish
different degrees of murder. Thus, the court argued that its decisions ensured that the jury
would decide whether there was the requisite intent to kill before imposing the death
penalty. The court argued that it was not second-guessing juries. Instead, it was maintain-
ing the "enduring value" that properly instructed juries, rather than judges, should decide
questions of guilt and innocence, and capital versus non-capital murder. Id. at 281. Indeed,
Senator John F Russo, the chief sponsor of the death penalty reinstatement law, later
agreed that the Gerald line of cases was consistent with his original intent; he noted that
the court was reserving the question of intent for the jury. Sullivan, supra note 74. In
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Governor Jim Florio also joined the chorus of critics of Gerald and
its progeny. He helped to secure a state constitutional amendment, passed
by the legislature and ratified by New Jersey voters, which declared, "[i]t
shall not be cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty
on a person convicted of purposely or knowingly causing death or pur-
posely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury resulting in death. ' 6
This amendment directly overturned the Gerald line of cases.
In State v. Harris," the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged
that the state constitutional amendment had overturned the Gerald line of
cases. The court, however, attempted to limit the impact of the constitu-
tional amendment by mandating that trial courts instruct juries about the
standard established by the United States Supreme Court "that the actor
be recklessly indifferent to whether the result of the conduct would be
death"' , 8 While this standard would allow the imposition of the death
penalty without an absolutely clear intent to kill, it could prohibit the
death penalty in those cases where the defendant had intent to cause seri-
ous bodily injury but was not recklessly indifferent to human life.
B. Comparative Proportionality Review
The court also ensured that the death penalty would apply to a nar-
row range of cases by overseeing the most rigorous comparative
proportionality review system of any state in the country. New Jersey's
comparative proportionality review, which was written into the 1982
death penalty legislation, required the supreme court to compare each
case in which the death penalty was imposed with similar cases to ensure
that the death penalty was being applied consistently.
Until 1999, when the comparative proportionality review system
was changed, comparative proportionality review and direct review were
separate processes. The supreme court would conduct proportionality re-
view only after the court had already upheld the case on direct appeal.
Since the supreme court overturned thirty-three of the first thirty-four
Dixon, the court vacated the capital murder conviction and the death sentence, but re-
manded the case to the trial court for sentencing on the lesser conviction of murder.
Dixon, 593 A.2d at 286.
76. NJ. CoNsT. art. I, § 12.
77. 662 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1995).
78. Id. at 344. This standard was developed by the Supreme Court in Tison v. Ari-
zona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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cases it reviewed after 1982, v9 the supreme court consequently only con-
ducted comparative proportionality review in one case.80
As the court upheld more death sentences on direct appeal in the
1990s, the court began to conduct comparative proportionality review
more frequently. Comparative proportionality review came to be viewed
as emblematic of the lengthy death penalty appeals process, which led to
calls from both Governor Florio and Governor Whitman to limit propor-
81tionality review.
Governor Florio signed into law a statute that limited the cases the
court could compare during proportionality review to those where a
death sentence had been imposed, rather than all death-eligible cases.82
Governor Whitman appointed a death penalty commission in 1998 that
criticized the length of the appeals process. The commission, chaired by
former U.S. Congressman Richard Zimmer, recommended that the state
abolish comparative proportionality review to decrease the length of the
83appeals process.
The court, however, refused to allow the legislature to limit com-
parative proportionality review, reasoning that the New Jersey
Constitution had granted the court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all capital cases. 84 The court continued to include all death-eligible cases
in its comparative proportionality review.8s The court held that propor-
tionality review was an essential part of the court's responsibility to ensure
that the "death penalty is being administered in an evenhanded and non-
discriminatory manner.' ' 6 However, the New Jersey Supreme Court did
accede to the recommendation of the Special Master for Proportionality
79. See supra note 4. See, e.g., State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792 (NJ. 1988) (declaring
that the court need not determine the proportionality of the sentence in light of the
court's reversal and remand).
80. In State v. Marshall (Marshall II), 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992), the court found that
Marshall's death sentence was proportional.
81. See Jerry Gray, Adviser Urges New Jersey High Court to Change Appeals of Death
Sentences, N.Y TIMES, May 5, 1999, at B6 (noting how critics of the process, including
GovernorWhitman "have contended that it can extend court cases for years");Jerry Gray,
Florio Signs Bill To Strengthen Death Penalty, N.YTIMES, May 13, 1992, at B6 (quoting Gov-
ernor Florio, who said, "[tlhe proportionality review, if left open-ended, could so frustrate
prosecutors that we'll never have a workable death penalty").
82. Gray, Florio Signs Bill, supra note 81.
83. David Kocieniewski, Trenton Court Upholds Law On Executions, N.Y TIMEs, Feb.
2, 1999, at B1.
84. State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 143 (N.J. 1999) (citing N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 5,
1(c)).
85. Id. at 146.
86. Id. at 144.
The Abolition of the Death Penalty in New Jersey
87Review, Judge David Baime, to combine direct appeal and comparative
proportionality review into one process."'
Despite the vigorous debate over comparative proportionality re-
view, the court found a death sentence to be disproportionate in only one
case, State v. Papasavvas.89 In that case, the court reviewed nineteen cases
with similar circumstances and determined that only one of those nine-
teen defendants had been sentenced to death.9 ° The court found that
particular defendant to have been "far more culpable than Papasavvas."9'
Moreover, fifteen of the eighteen defendants that had not been sentenced
to death had been at least as culpable as Papasavvas. 92 Therefore, the court
concluded, Papasavvas had been "singled out unfairly for the death pen-
alty!
9 3
Comparative proportionality review also influenced the outcome in
State v. DiFrisco.9 4 Anthony DiFrisco had lost his direct appeal in 1994, 4-3,
and his comparative proportionality review in 1995, 5-2. After the su-
preme court decided that the comparative proportionality review and
direct appeals processes should be consolidated, DiFrisco's attorneys
brought another appeal. In 2006, the court held that if the 1994 and 1995
votes were combined, a majority of the court had voted to overturn Di-
Frisco's sentence. Justice O'Hern, part of the four-judge majority
rejecting DiFrisco's direct appeal, was one of the two dissenting judges
who found DiFrisco's sentence disproportionate in the comparative
87. See infra Part III.A.
88. David S. Baime, Comparative Proportionality Review: The New Jersey Experience, 41
No. 2 CLuM. L. BULL. 7 (2005). Concern about the length of the appellate review process
did not subside. In fact, one trial court judge in a death penalty case demonstrated his
recognition of the length of the appellate process. After the jury returned its verdict of
death, trial court Judge Reginald Stanton amended the sentence to set a five-year deadline
for the defendant to be executed; if he was not executed within five years his sentence
would be changed to life in prison. Robert HanleyJudge Orders Death Penalty With A Five-
Year Deadline, N.Y TMES, May 8, 1999, at B5. In explaining his order from the bench, the
Judge said," [tihe process has become unacceptably cruel to defendants ... who spend long
years under sentence of death while the judicial system conducts seemingly interminable
proceedings which remind many observers of a cruelly whimsical cat toying with a
mouse." Id. While the judge recognized that he would be overturned by the supreme
court, he went on to say, "[i]t may be that we would be well advised to join most of the
civilized countries of the world in abolishing the death penalty ... But if we are to have a
death penalty, then we should have the skill, the courage, and the decency to carry out the
death sentences in a reasonably expeditious manner." Id. One month later, the New Jersey
Supreme Court issued a summary opinion eliminating the trial court's "condition of
automatic modification of the capital sentence to a life sentence." State v. Koskovich, 735
A.2d 570, 570 (N.J. 1999).
89. 790 A.2d 798,813 (N.J. 2002)
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 817-18.
93. Id.
94. 900 A.2d 820 (NJ. 2006).
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proportionality review. The court held that the two votes "must be com-
bined because they are aspects of the same determination-whether a
death sentence has been properly imposed."9' As a result, the court held
that DiFrisco had received four votes to overturn his sentence.
96
Although the United States Supreme Court had applied procedural
rules and defaults to limit the appeals of capital defendants,97 the New
Jersey Supreme Court was less willing to do so. The court found that Di-
Frisco's motion for a second post-conviction review, although it had been
filed five years after the deadline, should not be procedurally barred be-
cause DiFrisco's challenge was of "substantial importance" and necessary
to "avoid an injustice."98
III. SYSTEMIC REFORMS IN NEW JERSEY
The New Jersey Supreme Court also ordered numerous systemic re-
forms in an attempt to ensure consistency and fairness throughout the
system. In order to accomplish these goals, the court oversaw a rigorous
systemic proportionality review system and required prosecutors to sub-
mit aggravating factors to the grand jury.
A. Systemic Proportionality
In addition to comparative proportionality review, the New Jersey
Supreme Court also engaged in systemic proportionality review. The Su-
preme Court hired two Special Masters, first David Baldus, and then
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Coleman v.Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). In Coleman, the Court held that
the defendant's procedural default in state court, because of an untimely filing of notice of
appeal, barred him from federal habeas review, despite the fact that Coleman claimed that
his attorney's error led to the untimely filing. Id. at 725. The Court held that attorney
error would not constitute "cause" unless it constituted an independent violation of effec-
tive assistance to counsel; because there was no right to counsel in appeals from state
collateral review, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not possible in this instance.
Id.
98. Id. at 826. This was consistent with the court's decision in State v. Preciose, 609
A.2d 1280 (N.J. 1992). In Preciose, the court demonstrated that, at least in criminal matters,
it would consider issues despite procedural defaults that would ordinarily constitute waiver
of review. See Telephone Interview with Claudia Van Wyk, supra note 70. In that case, the
defendant, who had been sentenced to a forty-year maximum term, failed to raise his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. The court reversed the lower
court's denial of relief on these procedural grounds and remanded for a hearing on the
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; the court held that "[slimply put, con-
siderations of finality and procedural enforcement count for little when a defendant's life
or liberty hangs in the balance." Preciose, 609 A.2d at 1293. This approach was completely
contrary to Virginia's strict adherence to procedural rules which had been upheld by the
United States Supreme Court the previous year. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 725.
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Judge David Baime, to conduct systemic statistical reviews of New Jersey's
capital punishment system. The court was particularly concerned with
addressing any racial disparities in the system. Although the Special Mas-
ters' reports never found that race was a statistically significant factor in
capital punishment sentencing, every one of Judge Baime's reports noted
that the race of the victim was a factor that helped predict rates of capital
sentencing prosecutions."
However, Judge Baime argued that differences between rates of
capital prosecutions among New Jersey's counties accounted for any dis-
parities between rates of death penalty prosecutions in cases with Black
and White victims. The county disparities were first noticed in Professor
Baldus' reports, particularly "higher penalty trial rates in the non-urban
counties."' ° The Special Masters' reports noted that when county dispari-
ties were factored into the multivariate regression models, the race of the
victim was no longer a statistically significant predictive factor of death
penalty prosecutions.
In response to the Baime reports, New Jersey's death penalty oppo-
nents commissioned their own study which found that if all cases were
included in the model (for various reasons the Special Masters had ex-
cluded cases where policemen were killed), then the race of the victim
was a statistically significant factor in predicting death penalty prosecution
rates and the advancement of cases to penalty trial. This statistical sig-
nificance remained even when controlling for county disparities.
However, although numerous defendants argued that racial dispari-
ties made New Jersey's capital punishment system fundamentally unfair,
the court never accepted those arguments because of the findings of its
Special Masters. The court instead focused on limiting the county dispari-
ties in the percent of death-eligible cases that went to penalty trial.
99. See Telephone Interview with Mark Friedman, Assistant Deputy Pub. Defender,
Appellate Section (N.J.) (Mar. 13, 2008) (transcript on file with Michigan Journal of Race &
Law).
100. DAVID S. BAIME, REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT: SYSTEMIC PRO-
PORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT 2004-2005 TERM (2005), www.judiciary.state.nj.us/
pressrel/Baime2005Reportl2-16-05.pdf (citing DAVID BALDUS, FINAL REPORT TO THE
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT 22-23 (1991)).
101. Letter from New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the Death Penalty to Supreme
Court of New Jersey, Re: In re Proportionality Review Project (June 14, 2006) (on file
with Michigan Journal of Race & Law). See also DAViD S. BALME, REPORT TO TIE NEW JERSEY
SUPREME CoURT: SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT 2004-2005 TERM (2005),
www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/Baime2005Reportl2-16-05.pdf.
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B. Prosecutorial Discretion and County Disparities
The New Jersey Supreme Court first addressed the county dispari-
ties in State v. Koetadich.10 2 The court held that there was not enough
evidence to declare the death penalty statute unconstitutional "at this
time" because there could be a "myriad of reasons" for the disparity.
0 3
The court recommended that the New Jersey Attorney General work
with county prosecutors to develop guidelines for capital prosecution to
avoid arbitrariness and to "promote uniformity in the administration of
the death penalty."'' 0 4 The guidelines established committees of prosecutors
who would review all capital charging decisions in each county. However,
despite the creation of these capital review committees, the county dis-
parities did not dissipate.0 0
The court remained concerned about the statistical disparities in the
prosecution of the death penalty among counties in New Jersey. For ex-
ample, the percentage of death-eligible cases that had gone to penalty
trial since the reinstatement of the death penalty ranged from 0% in Som-
erset County to 63% in Monmouth County.0 6 The county disparities
were one of the reasons that the court insisted that the comparative pro-
portionality review include all death-eligible cases rather than just those
cases where a death sentence was imposed. 0 7 Including death-eligible100
cases meant that the universe of cases for comparative proportionality
review would include those cases where the prosecutor did not charge a
death-eligible defendant with capital murder.
In order to further address county disparities, Judge Baime recom-
mended that the court establish a statewide review procedure in which
the Attorney General would review all prosecutorial charging decisions in
death-eligible cases. Although Judge Baime presented this proposal to the
court, the death penalty was abolished before the court decided whether
to follow his recommendation. However, both the New Jersey Attorney
General and New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the Death Penalty
102. 548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988).
103. Id. at 953-4.
104. Id. at 955.
105. SeeVan Wyk, supra note 10, at 8 tbl.2 (documenting the continuing county dis-
parities); see also Telephone Interview with Joseph Krakora, supra note 23 (stating that the
capital review committees did not appear to have much effect).
106. Van Wyk, supra note 10, at 8 tbl.2.
107. State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129 (NJ. 1999).
108. Death-eligible cases were those cases where the prosecutor had served notice of
an aggravating factor. State v. Koetadich, 548 A.2d 939, 954 n.4 (N.J. 1988). Under the
death penalty statute, at least one aggravating factor had to be present before a defendant
could be eligible for the death penalty. N.J, STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(b)(2)-(4) (West 2006).
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(NJADP) opposed the proposal. 9 Both believed that the change might
lead to more death penalty charging decisions statewide. This fear was not
unfounded; this phenomenon was observed in federal death penalty
prosecutions after the United States Attorney General began reviewing all
federal death penalty charging decisions. 10
In the court's final step towards curbing prosecutorial discretion, the
court began to require prosecutors to submit aggravating factors to a
grand jury. In State v. Fortin (Fortin II). the court, overruling its holding
in State v. Martini (Martini I),112 held that the New Jersey Constitution's
grand jury provisions required prosecutors to submit aggravating factors
to a grand jury. The grand jury would have to return those aggravating
factors in an indictment before a capital murder trial could proceed. Pre-
viously the prosecutor had been able to wait until the penalty phase of
the trial to determine aggravating factors. It is unclear if this decision had
a significant impact on prosecutorial charging decisions; because the death
penalty was abolished three years after Fortin II, there is not enough data
to evaluate the effect of this decision.
IV STATE ACTORS' RESPONSE TO THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: A
DECLINE IN PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING DECISIONS
The repercussions of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions
were intensified by the prosecutorial responses to those decisions. In the
1980s, prosecutors brought 57% of death-eligible cases to a penalty trial.
In the 1990s that rate decreased to 18%, and between 2000 and 2004, that
rate decreased to 11%.1 3 This dramatic decrease occurred despite the fact
that the number of death-eligible homicides remained fairly steady over
that period."' Initially one might hypothesize that the decrease in prosecu-
torial charging decisions was tied to a nationwide decline in the imposition
of the death penalty. In fact, however, the nationwide imposition of the
109. Letter from New Jerseyans for Alternatives to the Death Penalty to Supreme
Court of New Jersey, supra note 101, at 4 (noting the opposition of both the New Jersey
Attorney General and NewJerseyans for Alternatives to the Death Penalty).
110. Id. at 19.
111. 843 A.2d 974 (NJ. 2004).
112. 619 A.2d 1208 (NJ. 1993). The Fortin II court held that the Supreme Court's
decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that aggravating factors were the equiva-
lent of an element of the offense, had changed the calculation regarding presentation of
aggravating factors to a grand jury. The court held that, because the aggravating factors
were essentially elements of the charge, they had to be presented to a grand jury. Fortin II,
843 A.2d at 1027-28.
113. Van Wyk, supra note 10, at 7 tbl.1. No death sentences were imposed after 2004.
Id. at 3; see discussion infra note 221; see also Appendix Table 1.
114. VanWyk, supra note 10, at 2,7 tbl.1.
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death penalty remained steady at around 300 death penalty sentences per
year from 1986 through 1999."'
Death sentences did not decrease nationally until 2000, when the
number of death sentences dropped to 235; the number of death sen-
116tences nationwide dropped to 167 in 2001. Many commentators
attribute this decrease to a growing concern about executing innocent
victims, a movement which grew stronger when Governor George Ryan
instituted a death penalty moratorium in Illinois in January 2000. The
moratorium came after evidence exonerated a number of death row in-
mates. Governor Ryan was concerned by the fact that since the
reinstatement of the death penalty in Illinois, more people had been ex-
onerated than had been put to death." '
The decrease in the number of death-eligible cases in New Jersey
that were brought to a penalty trial came before the exoneration issue
gained traction nationwide, and before death sentencing decreased na-
tionwide. The stark decline in New Jersey, from 57% of death-eligible
cases in the 1980s to 18% in the 1990s,11 8 was, at least in part, a response
to the New Jersey Supreme Court's reversal of thirty-three of the first
thirty-four cases it reviewed.
Qualitative evidence from experienced prosecutors supports the
quantitative evidence and the hypothesis that the state supreme court's
decisions had an effect on prosecutorial charging decisions. In fact, one
prosecutor, William Zarling, noted that, in response to the New Jersey
Supreme Court decisions, the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office "altered
the original philosophy that it began with and the death penalty became
reserved for only the most extreme cases. ' ' 19
115. Fox Butterfield, Ambivalence? Incompetence? Fairness? Behind the Death Row Bottle-
neck, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1998, at WK1; see also Death Penalty Information Center, Facts
About the Death Penalty, May 16, 2008, www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf. Exact
comparisons with other states are difficult because no state keeps percentages of death-
eligible cases brought to trial for all of the relevant time periods. Telephone Interview with
David Baldus, Joseph B. Tye Professor, Univ. of Iowa Coll. of Law (Mar. 6, 2008) (transcript
on file with Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
116. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 115.
117. William Claiborne, Ill. Governor, Citing Errors, Will Block Executions, WASH. POST,
Jan. 31, 2000, at Al.
118. In other words, in the 1980s, 57% of cases where the defendant was statutorily
eligible for the death penalty (because of the presence of at least one aggravating factor)
proceeded to a trial where the defendant was charged with the death penalty. In the 1990s,
only 18% of those cases preceded to a death penalty trial. In some cases, prosecutors could
have charged the defendant with the death penalty but then accepted a plea to life in
prison. Data on death penalty indictments is not available, however there is no indication
that plea bargain rates increased exponentially during this time to account for the dramatic
drop-off in death penalty trials. Telephone Interview with Claudia Van Wyk, Attorney
(Oct. 22, 2009) (transcript on file with Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
119. Murphy et al., supra note 9, at 82 (remarks ofWilham A. Zarling).
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Another prosecutor, John Redden, made similar observations. Mr.
Redden, who served as an Assistant Prosecutor, Deputy First Assistant
Prosecutor, and Chief Assistant Prosecutor in Essex and Morris counties
during his twenty-year prosecutorial career, was intimately involved in
decisions about when to seek the death penalty against defendants.' 20 Mr.
Redden served on the capital review committees set up in each prosecu-
tor's office; the committees decided when to seek the death penalty in
death-eligible cases. Mr. Redden said that he and other prosecutors un-
derstood the limitations that the New Jersey Supreme Court had put on
the imposition of the death penalty. -12 1 Prosecutors were aware of the
court's narrowing of the class of cases where the death penalty was appro-
priate, including cases such as Gerald. As Mr. Redden said, "The court was
not taking an expansive reading of this statute, so I as prosecutor could
not take an expansive view of the statute."
12 2
Prosecutors sought the death penalty only in those cases that they
thought the supreme court was likely to uphold under the court's "nar-
rowed scope of what constituted a capital case."'123 Prosecutors were forced
to respond to the court's decisions; a capital case that was overturned on
appeal could create a myriad of future problems for these prosecutors.
Because the supreme court was reversing guilty verdicts and not just
death sentences, prosecutors had to be concerned about what would hap-
pen to a case after it was reversed and remanded for a new trial. Death
penalty trials and appeals could take years, and it would be very difficult
for prosecutors to retry a murder case years after the initial conviction.
Witnesses might have moved or died, evidence could have been mis-
placed, and the case in general was "cold.' ' 24 At this point, prosecutors
would be in danger of losing their guilty verdict even on a non-capital
murder charge.
Therefore, prosecutors were very conscious of cases that the su-
preme court might overturn and became wary of trying those cases
capitally; if they did, and the cases were reversed, the defendant might be
able to just "walk away.'' Mr. Redden recalled that there were instances
in which prosecutors had to "strike a plea" after a death penalty case was
remanded for a new trial because the prosecutors were worried they
would not even get a non-capital murder conviction at the second trial.
12 6






126. Id. Redden noted that prosecutors were also aware that charging cases capitally
cost an extraordinary amount of time, money, and resources and exposed the family to "this
sort of false notion that there is going to be a death penalty." Id. As discussed above, it was
unlikely that New Jersey would actually execute a death row inmate. In fact, prosecutors
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Based on the decisions of the supreme court and the worry that
their cases would be reversed, prosecutors carefully reviewed each capital
case to make sure that the case was considerably likely to prevail, both at
trial and on appeal.' 27 These prosecutors had to predict which cases the
New Jersey Supreme Court would accept and "couldn't help but come
away with the notion that the supreme court was taking a narrow and
conservative approach as to what classifies as a death penalty case."'
' 28
The theory that prosecutors avoided bringing capital cases that they
thought the supreme court would overturn was demonstrated in the case
of Jonathan Zarate. Zarate was an eighteen year-old whom Redden and
his colleagues in the Morris County Prosecutor's Office began prosecut-
ing in 2005. The office was considering charging Zarate capitally after he
invited his next-door neighbor, sixteen year-old Jennifer Parks, over to his
house and then punched her and beat her with a metal pole. His fifteen
year-old brother, James Zarate, also stabbed Parks.'2 9 After killing her, the
brothers chopped her legs off below the knees and stuffed her body into
canvas bags and a steamer trunk. 130 The boys tried to dump Parks' body in
a river, but a police officer caught them in the act.131
The death penalty statute's list of aggravating factors included the
commission of a murder that "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated assault to the victim.' ' 2 However, the prosecutors were not positive
that this case would meet the New Jersey Supreme Court's definition of a
would have to "have their head in the sand not to have those thoughts go through their
mind." Id. Prosecutor William Zarling notes that "[i]f you were a prosecutor, you couldn't
help but get the message over time that the supreme court was not anxious to see anybody
die. It seemed to color one's judgment as to whether one wanted to go through the entire
process if you did not believe that the process was going to end up with a death result at
the end of the day anyway" Murphy et al., supra note 9, at 82 (remarks of William A. Zar-
ling). However, Redden noted that prosecutors were not supposed to engage in cost-
benefit analysis or take a defeatist attitude and that acting on those thoughts was "highly
improper."Telephone Interview with John Redden, supra note 7.While many prosecutors
might not have explicitly made decisions based on such an analysis, these thoughts might
still have been in the back of some prosecutors' minds. In fact, prosecutors sometimes did
mention these thoughts at internal meetings. Id. However, there is no evidence that prose-
cutors ever acted upon any strict cost-benefit analysis.
127. Telephone Interview with John Redden, supra note 7.
128. Id.
129. A judge later ruled that James, the fifteen year-old, could be charged as an adult
because of the "horrific nature" of the crime. Richard Cowen, Boy Charged as Adult in
Slaying: Brothers Accused of Killing Randolph Girl in 2005, THE RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.),
June 8, 2006, at L01.
130. Richard Cowen, Too Dangerous for Juvenile Jail; Teen Murder Suspect Sent to County
Lockup, THE RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.), June 23, 2006, at LO1. See also, Richard Cowen,
Youth Stabbed Girl, Judge Told; Clifton Teen Points Finger at Murder Suspect's Younger Brother,
THE RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.), Dec. 8, 2005, at L01.
131. Cowen, Youth Stabbed Girl, supra note 130.
132. N.J. STAT.ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c) (West 2006).
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murder that constituted torture or depravity of mind since the vilest as-
pects of the murder took place after the victim was already dead.
Although the supreme court had indicated in dicta in an earlier case that
it was inclined to find post-death mutilation as evidence of depravity of
mind, 3 3 the court had not explicitly found post-death mutilation to be
sufficient evidence of this aggravating factor. Therefore, the prosecutors
debated about whether the supreme court would uphold a potential
death penalty conviction in the Zarate case. As John Redden said, if there
was any doubt about whether a death penalty verdict would be upheld,
most New Jersey prosecutors would not seek the death penalty. Instead,
given the considerations about the case being overturned on appeal, the
prosecutors would be "more than happy to say, 'let's put this on the non-
capital side.' ,114 In the end, a spokesman for the prosecutor's office de-
clared that "none of the aggravating factors were met."131 Jonathan Zarate
was charged with non-capital murder. 136 He was convicted of murder and
sentenced to life in prison plus twenty-four years.3
David Baldus, New Jersey's former Special Master, has further cor-
roborated this hypothesis by suggesting that some prosecutors may have
understood the signals from the New Jersey Supreme Court and therefore
only sought the death penalty in the most severe cases where the court
might uphold the death penalty on appeal.' 38 Some prosecutors grew frus-
trated with the limits on the death penalty. As one prosecutor stated: "The
only death sentence we have in New Jersey is for the victims ... we have
no death penalty for those who commit the murders."'
3 9
The prosecutorial response to the supreme court's decisions played a
role in the death penalty abolition. The marked decline in the number of
cases where the prosecutor sought the death penalty further reduced the
death row population and made the likelihood of an execution in New
Jersey even more remote.
133. State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 230-31 n.37 (NJ. 1987).This was dicta because
the court overturned Ramseur's death penalty conviction. See discussion supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
134. Telephone Interview with John Redden, supra note 7.
135. Richard Cowen, Brothers Indicted in '05 Slaying of Girl, 16: Two Teens Face Life in
Prison if Convicted, THE RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.),Jan. 3, 2007, at L01.
136. Id.
137. Jim Lockwood,Justice for a 'Vile' Killer: Zarate Gets Life in Prison for Teen's Brutal
Murder, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, Nj.),Jan. 24,2009, at 1.
138. Telephone Interview with David C. Baldus, supra note 115; David C. Baldus,
Race and proportionality since McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): Different Actors with Mixed Strategies
of Denial and Avoidance, 39 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 143 (2007).
139. Sullivan, supra note 42.
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V THE NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION
In 2006, the legislature passed a bill establishing a moratorium on
the death penalty and creating the New Jersey Death Penalty Study
Commission. 140 The bill recognized that "[l]ife is the most valuable
possession of a human being; the State should exercise utmost care to pro-
tect its residents' lives from homicide, accident, or arbitrary or wrongful
taking by the State. 14' The Commission was mandated to hear public tes-
timony and consider all aspects of the death penalty, including whether
the death penalty served a rational penological interest, whether there
were significant disparities in the system, whether there would be a sig-
nificant cost difference if the state were to abolish the death penalty, and
whether alternatives existed that would ensure public safety.
The Commission held five public hearings throughout 2006 and is-
sued a report in 2007 recommending that the death penalty be
legislatively abolished and replaced by life in prison without parole. The
Commission made seven important formal findings. Although the full
report provides more detail, these findings can be summarized as follows:
1. Legitimate Penological Interest:While studies around the
country were inconclusive about the deterrent effect of
the death penalty,1 42 it was especially difficult to deter-
mine whether the death penalty in New Jersey had any
deterrent effect because no one had been executed since
1963. Any deterrence was "obviated" when the defen-
dants spent decades on death row and the vast majority
140. An Act Creating a Study Commission on the Death Penalty and Imposing a
Moratorium on Executions and Amending PL.1983, c.245, Pub. L. No. 2005 c. 321
(2006). New Jersey has always taken a considered approach to the death penalty. At the
1873 New Jersey Constitutional Convention, Jacob Lawrence Swayze submitted a pro-
posal to abolish the death penalty. Peter J. Mazzei & Robert FWilliams, Traces of its Labors:
The Constitutional Commission, 7e Legislature and Their Influence on the New Jersey State
Constitution, 1873-1875, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 1059 (2002). In the 100 years prior to the 2006
commission, there had been four other death penalty study commissions: 1907, 1964, 1971
and 1998.
141. An Act Creating a Study Commission on the Death Penalty, supra note 140.
142. NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 24. Compare
Cass R. Sunstein & AdrianVermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts Omissions,
and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703 (2005) (arguing that the death penalty has a
deterrent effect and saves lives) with John Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 843 (2005) ("The U.S.
data simply do not speak clearly about whether the death penalty has a deterrent or
anti-deterrent effect. The only clear conclusion is that execution policy drives little of the
year-to-year variation in homicide rates. As to whether executions raise or lower the
homicide rate, we remain profoundly uncertain."). See also Richard Berk, New Claims
About Executions and General Deterrence: D~ja vu All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
303 (2005) (finding that evidence of the deterrent effects of the death penalty disappears
when Texas is removed from the calculations of those deterrent effects).
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of death row prisoners eventually had their sentences
changed to life in prison.43
2. Cost: The commission found that, although it was diffi-
cult to measure precisely all the costs involved in the
death penalty, the death penalty imposed more costs than
life in prison without parole. One earlier outside study
had found that the State had spent $253 million on the
death penalty since 1982. M In addition to the financial
costs, the New Jersey Commission noted the intense
emotional costs of the death penalty as it was imposed in
New Jersey. Many victims' families had testified before
the Commission about the re-victimization that occurred
while the families suffered through numerous appeals.
The Commission found that these "intangible emotional
and psychological costs must also be taken into consid-
eration in weighing the costs of the death penalty."'4 5
3. Evolving Standards of Decency: The Commission found
"increasing evidence that the death penalty was inconsis-
tent with evolving standards of decency.' 14 6 Included in
143. NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 29.
144. Forsberg, supra note 19. Given the current financial crisis, cost considerations
might be especially important in other states debating death penalty abolition. In his writ-
ten testimony submitted to the New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission, Professor
Jeffrey Fagan asked whether the state's safety interests would be best served by spending
hundreds of millions of dollars over the next two decades to execute two or three indi-
viduals and have a number of other cases reversed on appeal.Jeffrey Fagan, supra note 6, at
12. Professor Fagan questioned whether it would be wiser to use that funding on "addi-
tional police detectives, prosecutors, victim services and judges to arrest and incarcerate
the many murderers, rapists, and robbers who currently escape any punishment because of
insufficient law enforcement resources." Id. The cost issue has already gained traction in
other states. For example, a recent California death penalty study commission report found
that the California death penalty system costs $137 million per year, whereas a system with
a maximum sentence of life in prison would cost California $11.5 million per year. CALI-
FORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND
PECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA
(2008), available at http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/FINAL REPORT DEATH
PENALTY ccfaj June 30.2008.pdf.
145. NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 34. Of course,
death penalty proponents argued that a way to reduce the costs of the death penalty was to
reduce the lengthy appeals process. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court had made
clear that this was not an option it was willing to entertain and that death penalty cases
would continue to receive exacting scrutiny.And given that there have been 139 exonera-
tions of death row inmates nationwide, see Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence:
List of Those Freed from Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-
freed-death-row (last visited Nov. 14, 2009), the supreme court's stance was unlikely to
change.
146. NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 1.
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this evidence were polls showing that while 44% of New
Jersey residents had supported the death penalty over life
without parole in 1999, that number had dropped to 36%
when polls were conducted in 2002 and 2005.' 47
4. Whether the Selection of Defendants was Arbitrary, Un-
fair, or Discriminatory: The commission found that the
"available data do not support a finding of invidious
racial bias in the application of the death penalty in New
Jersey."' 48 However, the Commission noted the statistical
disparities in the race of victims (defendants who killed
White victims were more likely to receive the death pen-
alty) and the county disparities. The Commission wrote
that the statistics should be viewed "in light of the reality
that racial discrimination is part of the history of the
death penalty in the 20" century.,' The Commission
found that abolishing the death penalty would eliminate
concerns about the effects that county disparities and
race of the victim had on potential death penalty cases.
5. Proportionality: The Commission found that there may
not be a "significant difference between crimes selected
for the death penalty and those selected for life in
prison." ° The Commission found that the risk of dis-
proportionality and the resulting increased risk of
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty was unaccept-
able given the finality of an execution. Once again,
abolition of the death penalty would solve this problem
by eliminating questions about proportionality.
6. Innocence: The Commission found that "[t]he penologi-
cal interest in executing a small number of persons guilty
of murder is not sufficiently compelling to justify the risk
of making an irreversible mistake."'5 ' The Commission
noted that although there had not been an exoneration
of anyone sentenced to death in New Jersey, there had
been exonerations in non-capital cases in New Jersey.'1
2
7. Alternatives: The Commission found that life in prison
without parole would ensure public safety and address
the interests of victims' families. The majority of victims'
147. Id. at 35.
148. Id. at 1.
149. Id. at 44.
150. Id. at 46.
151. Id. at 51.
152. Id.
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families had testified in favor of replacing the death pen-
alty with life without parole; for example, the New Jersey
Victims' Law Center had testified that the death penalty
is the "greatest failing of the justice system in New Jer-
sey" because of its re-victimization of victims' families.53
As John Gibbons, the former Chief Judge of the Third
Circuit, testified, "[t]he result in this state is that a sen-
tence of death is in reality a sentence to incarceration in
death row for decades, with the threat of execution over-
hanging the prisoner at all times, and the prolongation of
painful uncertainty for the families of victims.""54 The
Commission argued that the savings from the death pen-
alty should be spent on services for victims' families.'
There is a consensus that the testimony of victims' families, the dan-
ger of executing an innocent person, and the costs of the death penalty
system influenced the commission's recommendations.16 Some of the
victims' family members who testified in opposition to the death penalty
were morally opposed to the death penalty. But other victims' family
members, including a Death Penalty Study Commission member who
supported the death penalty in theory, had come to oppose New Jersey's
system. They viewed it to be a "joke" of a system that was never going to
execute anyone. 1 7 Victims' family members who later testified before the
state assembly in favor of death penalty repeal argued that "[t]o be mean-
ingful, justice should be swift and sure. Life without parole, which begins
immediately, is both of these; the death penalty is neither."'58
153. Id. at 58.
154. Id. at 60.
155. Id. at 2.
156. See Telephone Interview with Celeste Fitzgerald, supra note 22; Telephone In-
terview with Joseph Krakora, supra note 23; Telephone Interview with Claudia Van Wyk,
supra note 70.
157. NEw JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 94.
158. New Jersey Homicide Survivors for S- 171, Testimony before the Assembly Law and
Public Safety Committee, in LESNIAK supra note 13, at 51. This statement was made by vic-
tims' family members who supported the death penalty abolition bill. It is important to
note that the original bill proposed by Senator Lesniak only imposed a sentence of man-
datory life without parole if the defendant had murdered a law enforcement officer, a
child, or engaged in certain sexual crimes during the course of a murder; for other crimes
where a statutory aggravating factor existed, life without parole was a possible, but not
mandatory, sentence. However, due to legislative compromises, the final bill mandated a
sentence of life without parole if any statutory aggravating factor was present. An Act to
Eliminate the Death Penalty and Allow for Life Imprisonment Without Eligibility for
Parole. Pub. L. No. 2007, c. 204 § 1 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp.
2008).Yvonne Smith Segars, the New Jersey Public Defender, and a member of the New
Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission, wrote an addendum to the commission's report
noting the problems with a mandatory sentence of life without parole. NEW JERSEY DEATH
PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION, suipra note 3, at 89. Ms. Segars supported the commission's
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It is also clear, however, that the absence of executions in New Jer-
sey played an important role in the decision to recommend abolition. In
essence, the fact that there had been no executions in forty-four years in
New Jersey created the space for victims' families to oppose the death
penalty. It allowed commission members, including victims' advocates and
law enforcement representatives, to recommend abolition. Five commis-
sion members were family members of murder victims. ' 9 Yet, only one
member of the commission disagreed with its conclusion-Senator John
Russo, the original sponsor of the 1982 death penalty legislation.
160
VI. NEW JERSEY'S DEATH PENALTY IS ABOLISHED
After the Commission recommended abolition of the death penalty,
the New Jersey Legislature, voting largely on party lines, passed legislation
replacing the death penalty with life in prison without the possibility of
parole.1 61 Even some Senators who co-sponsored the death penalty legis-
lation in 1982 voted to abolish the death penalty. Senator Richard Codey,
one of those Senators, explained his support for the bill succinctly:
The best thing for us as a society to do is to be honest with
them [murder victims' families]. Don't tell someone that we're
going to execute somebody when the reality is it's not going
to happen-at least here in the state of New Jersey. Maybe in
Texas. Maybe in other states. But it's not going to happen here
in New Jersey, and we've got to accept that.
62
recommendations, but noted that the mandatory imposition of life without parole did not
allow for a weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors as occurred during the penalty
phase of a death penalty trial. Id. As Ms. Segars pointed out, imposing mandatory life
without parole would lead to more defendants receiving a sentence of life without parole
than would have received a death sentence. Id. at 90. In addition, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly acknowledged that "death is different" and therefore deserving of enhanced
procedural protections. See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the
Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHio ST.J. CiuM. L. 117, 117 & n.1 (2004) (listing various cases
where the Supreme Court has recognized the uniqueness of the death penalty). Thus,
those sentenced to life without parole would likely find it more difficult than those sen-
tenced to death to get close judicial review of their cases. The Supreme Court has held
that mandatory life without parole does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
159. Jon S. Corzine, Remarks on Eliminating Death Penalty in New.Jersey, in LESNIAK
supra note 13, at 65.
160. Id. at 79-83.
161. Of the four Republicans who voted for the bill in the Senate, three were lame-
duck Senators who were not returning to the Senate in the upcoming legislative session.
The bill received twenty-one votes in the forty-member chamber, and Republican leaders
criticized Democrats for bringing the bill to a vote in the lame-duck session. Jeremy W
Peters, New Jersey Nears Repeal of Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,2007, at B1.
162. Id.
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The bill was signed into law by Governor Jon Corzine on Decem-
ber 17, 2007. Corzine simultaneously commuted the sentences of the
eight men on death row to life without parole.163
VII. MIGHT ABOLITION IN NEW JERSEY LEAD
TO NATIONWIDE ABOLITION?
After the abolition of the death penalty in New Jersey it was unclear
how other states would respond. After New Jersey's abolition, op-eds and
editorials appeared in numerous newspapers from states including Florida,
Maryland, Oregon, North Carolina, and Illinois encouraging their state to
follow New Jersey's lead. 164 The lessons learned from New Jersey are most
applicable to those states where few, if any, executions have occurred;
there are twelve states that have executed fewer than three people since
the reinstatement of the death penalty in that particular state. 165 It is also
telling that all six of the people executed in the past ten years in those
twelve states had dropped their death penalty appeals. 66
In fact, after initial drafts of this Note were written, New Mexico
followed New Jersey's lead and became the second state in over forty
years to legislatively abolish the death penalty.'67 New Mexico had only
163. Peters, supra note 2.
164. See, e.g., Editorial, Abolish Death Penalty, SPRINGFIELD ST.J. -REG., Dec. 23, 2007,
at 14; Stephen Dear & Diann Rust-Tierney, Rethinking the Death Penalty, NEWS & OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 23, 2007, at A23; Editorial, Follow New Jersey's Lead, RG.-
GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Dec. 24, 2007, at A8; Associated Press, N.J.'s Repeal of Death Penalty
Bolsters Maryland Movement, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY, Dec. 27, 2007, at C8; Waldo Proffitt,
Op-Ed., State Should Drop the Death Penalty, SARASOTA HERALD TPIn.,Jan. 13,2008, at F3.
165. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 26.Those states (with the number
of executions since death penalty reinstatement in parentheses) are New Hampshire (0),
Kansas (0), Connecticut (1), Colorado(1), Idaho(1), Wyoming(l), South Dakota(l), Ore-
gon(2), Kentucky(3), Montana(3), Pennsylvania(3), and Nebraska(3). Id. Pennsylvania,
however, is a bit of an anomaly; while most of these twelve states have few death row in-
mates, Pennsylvania has 226 inmates on death row. Death Penalty Information Center,
State by State Database, http://wvw.deathpenaltyinfo.org/stateby-state (last visited Nov.
18, 2009). In Pennsylvania, a death sentence is more common, but executions are still quite
rare. Moreover, the three executions in Pennsylvania took place only after the defendants
voluntarily dropped their appeals. Fagan, supra note 6, at 11. Further research into the
death penalty in Pennsylvania is needed in order to explain this phenomenon.
166. Data compiled from Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Execution
Database, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). Some schol-
ars argue that death row inmates electing to drop their appeals might be a sign that life
without parole can be a "stronger deterrent than death." Jeffrey Fagan, Testimony to the
Maryland Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment 14 (Sept. 5, 2008) (transcript
on file with Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
167. Barry Massey, State Supreme Court Won't Rule on Astorga's Death Penalty Appeal,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 17, 2009. The death penalty repeal in New Mexico does not apply
retroactively; those defendants convicted of crimes that were committed before the repeal
in July are still eligible for the death penalty. Id. After the legislative repeal, the New
FALL 2009]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
executed one person since the death penalty was reinstated in New
Mexico in 1979.168 That person, Terry Clark, had decided to stop appeal-
ing his case. 169 Unlike Governor Corzine in New Jersey, who was
personally opposed to the death penalty, Governor Richardson of New
Mexico believed that the death penalty was an appropriate penalty in
some circumstances. He called the decision to sign the law the "most dif-
ficult decision" of his political life)" More than three-quarters of the
12,000 public comments that Richardson received were in favor of death
penalty repeal. 7 1 In discussing his views on abolition, Governor Richard-
son noted the costs of the death penalty,7 2 although he primarily cited
concerns about the execution of an innocent person. He highlighted that
"130 death row inmates have been exonerated in the past 10 years in this
country, including four New Mexicans.
'' 73
New Jersey and New Mexico are not complete outliers. In fact,
there has been much legislative activity regarding death penalty repeal in
recent years, especially in states that have executed three or fewer people
since death penalty reinstatement. 7 4 In 2000, the New Hampshire Legis-
lature voted to repeal the death penalty but Governor Jeanne Shaheen
Mexico Supreme Court declined to decide on a facial constitutional challenge to the
death penalty. Id. There are at least two defendants currently facing death penalty prosecu-
tion in New Mexico. Id. In addition, because Governor Richardson did not commute the
sentences of the two inmates currently on New Mexico's death row, those inmates are still
facing potential execution. Dave Maass, Uncertain Fates, SANTA FE REP., Sept. 23, 2009, at
13.
168. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 28.
169. Data compiled from Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 166.
170. In New Mexico, Death Penalty Dies, VA. PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Mar. 28, 2009, at
8.While Governor Richardson was a lame duck governor (due to term-limits) at the time
he signed the bill, Lieutenant Governor Diane Denish, who was running to replace him as
Governor, publicly urged him to sign the bill. Boyd, supra note 27.
171. Editorial, Democracy Lives in Death-Penalty Ruling, ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 20,
2009, at A8.
172. See infra note 182.
173. Bill Richardson, Op-Ed., I No Longer Believe We Can Know Enough to Justify a
Death Sentence: Mistakes Prove System Too Impefect To Be Just, CONCORD MONITOR, Mar. 20,
2009.
174. In fact, although abolition bills might be unlikely to pass in some of these states,
abolition bills were introduced in eleven states in 2009: Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois,
Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, and Wash-
ington. Death Penalty Information Center, 2009-Proposed or Passed Legislation,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislative-activity# 2 00 9 (last visited Nov. 16,
2009). Those eleven states constitute approximately one-third of the states that currently
have death penalty statutes on the books. Although the mere introduction of a bill obvi-
ously does not signify whether it is likely to pass, several of these states came close to
legislative abolition, and New Mexico did legislatively abolish the death penalty. See dis-
cussion infra. Moratorium bills were also introduced in Alabama, Delaware, Georgia,
Missouri, and Nevada. Death Penalty Information Center, 2009-Proposed or Passed Legis-
lation, supra.
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vetoed the bill.' 7s The New Hampshire House voted for repeal again in
2009,176 but the bill was tabled in the New Hampshire Senate.1 77 In 2009,
Connecticut passed a bill to repeal the death penalty, but Governor Jodi
Rell vetoed it. 7 8 Also in 2009, the Colorado House passed a bill to repeal
the death penalty, but the bill lost by one vote in the Colorado Senate.
17 9
All of these states had executed three of fewer people since the reinstate-
ment of the death penalty.'8°
Maryland, which had executed five people since the reinstatement
of the death penalty, has also considered legislative abolition; instead of
abolishing the death penalty, however, the state legislature recently passed
a bill that would significantly limit the classes of cases that are death-
eligible.18
175. New Hampshire Veto Saves Death Penalty, N.Y.TIMES, May 20,2000, at A16.
176. Lauren R. Dorgan, House Votes to Repeal Death Penalty, CONCORD MONITOR, Mar.
26, 2009.
177. Chelsea Canaboy & Lauren R. Dorgan, Marijuana Approved, Seatbelts Tabled,
CONCORD MONITOR, Apr. 30, 2009.
178. Christopher Keating, Rell Vetoes Bill to Abolish Capital Punishment, HARTIORD
COURANT, June 6, 2009, at A3. Michael Lawlor, the co-chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee made an argument in favor of the bill that bore a striking resemblance to the
argument Senator Codey had made regarding New Jersey's death penalty. See supra note
162. Lawlor said, "[i]n Connecticut, we're never really going to execute someone against
their will .... Don't we owe it to the citizens of our state and the families of the victims
to tell them the truth?" Keith M. Phaneuf, House Votes to Abolish Death Penalty: But Sup-
porters Acknowledge It's Not Likely to Happen This Year,J. INQUIRER (Manchester, Conn.), May
14,2009.
179. Jessica Fender, Death Penalty Survives: Anguish Over Cold Cases; After Passing the
House Last Week and Evading Senate Efforts to Kill It, the Bill Met Its Demise by a Single Vote,
DENVER POST, May 7, 2009, at Al. The bill would have used the cost-savings from death
penalty abolition to create a cold-case task force. Kirk Johnson, Death Penalty Repeal Fails
in Colorado, N.Y.TMES, May 4,2009, at A16. Howard Morton, the head of a victim's rights
groups in Colorado argued in favor of repeal. He said, "[w]e've tried 130 times in Colo-
rado to impose the death penalty since 1970, and we executed one guy .... Any other
program in state government with such a lousy record would have been abolished a long
time ago." Paul Hammel, Death Penalty Pits Costs vs. Closure, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May
3,2009.
180. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 26.
181. In Maryland, a death penalty commission also recommended abolition. MARY-
LAND COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(2008), http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/death-penalty-
commission-final-report.pdf. The commission vote, thirteen to nine, see id., was much
closer than the vote on New Jersey's commission. A bill abolishing the death penalty did
not pass, despite significant pressure from Governor Martin O'Malley, a long-time death
penalty opponent. Julie Bykowicz & Gadi Dechter, Chaos in the Senate: Lawmakers Turn
Away Repeal of Death Penalty; Debate to Resume Today, BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 2009, at IA. Inter-
estingly, state senators from Baltimore County, the county that accounts for forty-five
percent of the state's death penalty cases, despite having only twelve percent of the death-
eligible murder cases, were largely responsible for the defeat of the abolition bill in the
Maryland Senate. Bykowicz & Dechter, supra. However, the final product of the commis-
sion's efforts was the passage of the narrowest death penalty bill in the country. Interview
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Before signing the bill in New Mexico, New Mexico Governor Bill
Richardson had discussed concerns about the costs of the death penalty.
' s2
This argument may have added resonance in the current economic cli-
mate. Governor Richardson called the cost concerns "a valid reason in
this era of austerity and tight budgets. ' 3 As states face dramatic budget
crunches, some states are reducing or considering reducing prison popu-
lations in order to save costs.18 4 Legislators in those states might be
particularly amenable to arguments about the cost of the death penalty
when compared to life without parole, especially if the death penalty is
infrequently used in that state.
While the New Jersey Supreme Court created a somewhat unique
system of capital review, statistics demonstrate that many other states also
engage in exacting judicial review of death penalty cases. One study of all
death penalty cases nationwide from 1973 to 1995 found that those cases
were reversed 68% of the time.8" In addition, New Jersey is not the only
with Jeffrey Fagan, Prof. of Law and Epidemiology, Columbia Law Sch. (Nov. 12, 2009)
(transcript on file with Michigan Journal of Race & Law). The bill limits the imposition of
the death penalty to those cases with conclusive DNA evidence, video evidence, or a
videotaped voluntary confession. Bykowicz & Dechter, supra. These requirements are ex-
tremely narrow and are likely to limit the imposition of the death penalty in Maryland.
Fagan notes four reasons why Maryland did not follow New Jersey's model: 1) unlike
New Jersey, Maryland had recently executed a defendant; 2)the presence of a zealous
prosecutor in Baltimore County, a violent inner-city surrounded by rich suburbs, who
continued to try capital cases; 3) the Maryland Supreme Court did not narrow the class of
death-eligible cases as the court in New Jersey did; and 4) opponents of repeal feared that
withotit a death penalty, there would be no way to deter those already sentenced to life in
prison from murdering prison guards; this was a particularly salient concern due to the
fact that Maryland had the highest rate of prison guard murders in the country. Interview
with Jeffrey Fagan, supra.
182. Ian Urbina, Citing Costs, States Consider End to the Death Penalty, N.Y TIMES, Feb.
24, 2009, at Al.
183. Id.
184. Id. However, many Americans erroneously believe that it is cheaper to execute
someone than to incarcerate him or her for life. For example, a study found that a major-
ity of Californians believed execution was cheaper than incarceration. John Diaz, Op-Ed.,
The High Cost of Vengeance, S.F CHRON., Sept. 13, 2009, at E6. This is important because the
percentage of Californians who believe that the death penalty is an effective deterrent has
fallen from 74% in 1989 to 44% in 2009. Id. And while a majority of Californians support
the death penalty, that support drops to 26% when life without parole (While forcing the
defendant to work to pay restitution to the victim's family) is presented as an alternative.
Id. A cost argument might have particular impact in California, where the state's death
row houses 700 inmates, but the state has executed only 13 inmates since the reinstate-
ment of the death penalty. Estimates are that California's death row costs $114 million per
year more than it would cost if the same inmates were sentenced to life without parole.
Editorial, High Cost of Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, at A22.
185. JAMES S. LIEBMAN, ET AL., A BROKEN SYsTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES,
1973-1995 2 (2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/ instructionalservices/liebman/
liebman-final.pdf. During this same period, the reversal rate of death penalty cases in New
Jersey was 87%. Id. at 143 n.147.
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state with a lengthy appeals process. The average time nationwide from
sentencing to execution has been steadily increasing over the past decade
from ten years in 1996 to thirteen years in 2009.186 In fact, the states that
conduct few executions might heed Justice White's argument in Furman
that "the death penalty could so seldom be imposed that it would cease to
be a credible deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other end of
punishment in the criminal justice system.' 87
If other states follow New Jersey's lead, fulfilling Justice Brandeis' vi-
sion of states as laboratories of experimentation, 188 this state-by-state
repeal could spark nationwide repeal. Under this vision, states might look
to see the results of legislative death penalty repeal in New Jersey and
New Mexico. States may be particularly interested in examining the effect
that the repeals have on criminal justice system costs, violent crime rates,
and the way that victims' families feel about the criminal justice system.
As one preliminary piece of evidence, the number of murders in New
Jersey actually decreased slightly in the year after the death penalty was
abolished.' 9 If these statistics hold up over time, this would seem to un-
dermine the argument that the death penalty is a necessary deterrent to
murder. 90
Politicians in other states will no doubt be interested in the political
repercussions of repeal for those politicians who voted for the repeal stat-
utes in New Jersey and New Mexico. Death penalty repeal in New Jersey
does not appear to have had negative political repercussions for New Jer-
sey politicians. In fact, Chris Christie, a former U.S. Attorney who
186. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Capital Punishment,
2007-Statistical Tables, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2007/tables/
cp07stll.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2009). A national study has found that 26% of
those who support the death penalty would lessen their support of the death penalty
based on the fact that "it takes too long to go through the whole appeals process in
death penalty cases and only a few of those sentenced to death are actually executed."
See RICHARD C. DIETER, A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE: AMERICANS' DOUBTS ABOUT THE DATH
PENALTY (2007), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/CoC.pdf. This factor was the second
most important, after the execution of innocent people, in terms of persuading those who
support the death penalty to alter their views. Id. Note that the margin of error for this
survey is 3.1%. Id. at 15.
187. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,311 (1972) (White,J., concurring).
188. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
189. Compare NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING UNIT, CRIME IN
NEw JERSEY: FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2008 12 (2009), http://www.njsp.org/
info/ucr2008/index.htmI (reporting 376 murders statewide in 2008), with NEW JERSEY
STATE POLICE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING UNIT, CRIME IN NEW JERSEY: FOR THE YEAR
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2007 12 (2008), http://www.njsp.org/info/ucr2007/index.html
(reporting 381 murders statewide in 2007). Although one cannot draw any conclusions
based on just one year of data, this data at least makes clear that worries about a spike in
homicides post-repeal are, as yet, unfounded.
190. See supra note 142 for a further discussion of deterrence.
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recently beat Governor Corzine in a bitter campaign for New Jersey
Governor, did not make death penalty repeal into a campaign issue and
does not seem inclined to reinstate the death penalty. Although he sup-
ports the death penalty, his campaign website did not appear to mention
the death penalty at all.' 9'
If politicians in other states pass death penalty abolition bills, the Su-
preme Court may view this legislative action as pertinent evidence in its
evaluation of the constitutionality of the death penalty. In previous capital
punishment decisions, the United States Supreme Court has examined
state trends to help determine what constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 92 In recent years, the Supreme Court has overturned the death
penalty for the mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia,'9 3 and for minors in
Roper v. Simmons, '94 in part based on the number of states that had abol-
ished the death penalty for those classes of defendants. In Atkins, the
Court, in justifying its reliance on changes in state law, held that
A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the stan-
dards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over
the 'Bloody Assizes' or when the Bill of Rights was adopted,
but rather by those that currently prevail. As ChiefJustice War-
ren explained in his opinion in Trop v. Dulles: 'The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man.... The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.'9 5
191. See, e.g., Christie for Governor, Issues, http://www.christiefornj.com/index.php
(last visited Nov. 19, 2009).As further evidence that Chris Christie did not make the death
penalty a campaign issue, a search of the Westlaw database containing New Jersey newspa-
pers finds no articles discussing Chris Christie's position on the death penalty. When the
same search was conducted two weeks after the election, the search again returned zero
articles. On the other hand, Governor Corzine sought to use the abolition to his electoral
advantage. David M. Halfbinger & David Kocieniewski, A Rivalry as Strained as New Jerseys
Finances, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 30, 2009, at Al ("Mr. Corzine seemed almost resentful that he
was not more appreciated by voters or the news media, citing unsung accomplishments
like the passage of a civil unions law, paid family leave and the abolition of the death pen-
alty.").
192. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005);Atkins v.Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002); Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 782 (1982). In fact,Justice Marshall foreshadowed this
examination of state law trends in his concurring opinion in Furman. Furnan, 408 U.S. at
298 (Marshall,J., concurring). In that opinion,Judge Marshall wrote, "it is significant that
nine States no longer inflict the punishment of death under any circumstances, and five
others have restricted it to extremely rare crimes." Id. Marshall also noted that "[iun addi-
tion, six States, while retaining the punishment on the books in generally applicable form,
have made virtually no use of it." Id. at n.53.
193. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
194. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
195. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (citation omitted).
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In fact, the Justices have looked to changes in state law in areas as di-
verse as sodomy and evidentiary privileges to help determine the
outcome of Supreme Court cases. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas 96 the
majority opinion noted the changes that had occurred in state laws
around the country since the Court's decision upholding Georgia's sod-
omy ban in Bowers v. Hardwick.197 The majority noted that "[t]he [twenty-
five] States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the
Bowers decision are reduced now to [thirteen] " ' 98 The Court considered
this, among several other factors, as weighing in favor of overruling the
Bowers precedent.
In an analogous context, the Court has demonstrated that it will
look to state policy to help determine evidentiary privileges. In Jaffee v.
Redmond, 99 the Court held that "the fact that all [fifty] States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist
privilege" confirmed that it was appropriate for the federal courts to rec-
ognize this privilege.200 The Court found the changes in state evidentiary
law to be relevant even though most of these changes were legislative and
not judicial.2 0 ' The Court found that "the policy decisions of the States
bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new
privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one., 2 2 This is not to say
that state-level action is the only way to get the Supreme Court to over-
turn precedent; however, it is clear that a change of state law in a
significant number of states is one way to facilitate Supreme Court action.
Given that many states modeled their death penalty statutes on the
Model Penal Code (MPC),20 3 it is also significant that the American Law
Institute (ALL), which developed the MPC, recently decided to withdraw
the capital punishment section of the MPC.2°4 In withdrawing the section,
196. 539 U.S. 558,573 (2003).
197. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
198. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
199. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
200. Id. at 12. See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1980) (finding
that one of the factors that merited reversal of the privilege to prevent adverse spousal
testimony was that seven states had eliminated that privilege since the Court upheld the
privilege in 1958).
201. Jaffe, 518 U.S. at 13 ("It is of no consequence that recognition of the privilege in
the vast majority of States is the product of legislative action rather than judicial deci-
sion.").
202. Id. at 12-13.
203. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Report to the ALL Concerning Capital
Punishment, in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBER-
SHIP OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY at Annex
B2 (2009), http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital Punishmentweb.pdf.
204. The American Law Institute, Message from ALl Director Lance Liebman,
http://www.ali.org/-news/10232009.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) (citing THE AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 203, at 4-5). This section, Section 210.6, was adopted in
1962 to "prescribe procedures for the imposition of capital punishment." Steiker & Steiker,
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the ALl cited concerns about the administration of capital punishment in
the United States. 20 The ALI's action, after forty-seven years of keeping
the capital punishment section on the books, may further spur state-level
abolition. If the twelve states that have executed fewer than three defen-
dants since 1976 were to abolish the death penalty, they would join the
fifteen states that have already abolished the death penalty. This would
mean that more than half of the states would have abolished the death
penalty. Most importantly, the change would presumably be in one direc-
tion. The Court has made clear that in the death penalty context, "it is not
so much the number of these states that is significant, but the consistency
of direction of change.' '20 6 In fact, at the time of Roper v. Simmons, only five
207states had abolished the death penalty for minors since the death penalty
for minors was upheld in Stanford v. Kentucky.2 8 However, in other con-
texts, the Supreme Court has indicated a reluctance to overturn laws
favored by at least half of the states." It is not clear that the Supreme
Court would apply the same test in the death penalty context. However, if
in the future, only twenty-three states retained the death penalty, the Su-
preme Court could declare the death penalty to be unconstitutional
under either test.
CONCLUSION
Predicting how the Supreme Court would decide a constitutional
challenge to the death penalty years from now is difficult. State-by-state
repeal, however, is a potential avenue for nationwide abolition. Both pro-
ponents and opponents of the death penalty would be wise to pay heed
supra note 203, at Annex B1. Steiker and Steiker suggest that the United States Supreme
Court's "constitutional regulation of capital punishment has not succeeded on its own
terms." Id. at Annex B21. Other scholars may wish to examine whether the New Jersey
Supreme Court was truly "successful" at devising a system of constitutional regulation for
the death penalty in New Jersey.
205. The American Law Institute, supra note 204, (citing THE AMERiCAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, supra note 203, at 4-5).
206. Atkins v.Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,315 (2002).
207. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Four of those states had abolished the
death penalty for minors through the legislative process, while the fifth had done so
through the judicial process. Thus, the Court made clear that legislative enactments were
not the only indicia of state trends. In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the judicial aboli-
tion, which did not "purport" to rely on "popular sentiment," was "irrelevant to the
question of changed national consensus." Id. at 612 n.4 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
208. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
209. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the Supreme Court would not overturn the anti-
sodomy laws of "some 25 states."). Under this scenario, even if Pennsylvania, which has a
large death row, see discussion supra note 165, did not join the other eleven states in abol-
ishing the death penalty, there would still be twenty-six states that had abolished the death
penalty.
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to the potential for state-by-state legislative repeal. If this legislative repeal
occurs, it will be a slow-moving process, and change will not happen
overnight. Indeed, death penalty proponents can take solace in the fact
that nationwide abolition of the death penalty is unlikely to come any day
soon. However, the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence is
evolving and has proved to be responsive to state-by-state action, so there
remains a possibility of nationwide repeal.
Although death penalty opponents can draw comparisons to Roper
and Atkins, the important distinction between these cases and the death
penalty overall is that in Roper and Atkins the Court recognized that the
execution of minors or mentally retarded people was "infrequent ' 210 or
"uncommon 21 1 in those states still permitting their executions. Therefore,
the Supreme Court's recognition of state-level trends in Roper and Atkins
does not perfectly translate into Supreme Court recognition of state-level
death penalty abolition trends; presumably, some of the states that will
retain the death penalty would still be executing a moderate number of
people.212
However, the Court might recognize the increasing isolation and
concentration of the use of the death penalty2 13 As Justice Breyer recently
argued, half of the nation's death penalty cases come from three percent of
the counties in the United States. t 4 Moreover, nationwide, death penalty
210. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553.
211. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
212. Note, however, that the number of death sentences has decreased even in death-
penalty states like Texas-from an average of 34 per year from 1994 to 2004, Adam Liptak,
At 60% of Total, Texas is Bucking Execution Trend, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 2007, at Al, to 11 in
2008. Richard Lacayo, The Tide Shifts Against the Death Penalty, TIME, Feb. 3, 2009. While
that number would have been higher without the death penalty moratorium ordered by
the consideration of Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), it is still a sharp decine.This may
also be due in part to Texas' recent adoption of life without parole as an alternative to the
death penalty.John Moritz, The Life Penalty, TEX. OBSERVER, Nov. 28, 2008, at 14.
213. Moreover, the United States is becoming increasingly isolated internationally in
its imposition of the death penalty. Justice Kennedy in his opinion in Roper recognized
that "[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions." Roper, 543 U.S.
at 578. 94% of the world's executions in 2006 took place in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
the United States. See Amnesty International Australia, Death Penalty: 20, 000 on Death Row
Across the World, Apr. 29, 2006, http://action.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/225/. More-
over, in China, the number of executions has decreased from as many as 15,000 a year a
decade ago to around 1,700 people in 2008. Andrew Jacobs, China Pledges Fewer Death
Sentences, N.Y.TIMES,July 29, 2009, at A12. In July 2009, the Chinese government declared
that the death penalty should be reserved for the most serious crimes; the government
vowed to further reduce executions in China. Id.
214. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("more than two-
thirds of American counties have never imposed the death penalty since Gregg (2,064 out
of 3,066), and only 3% of the Nation's counties account for 50% of the Nation's death
sentences (92 out of 3,066)"). Moreover, only seven states,Texas,Virginia, Oklahoma, Flor-
ida, Georgia, South Carolina, Ohio, conducted executions in both 2008 and 2009
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sentences have decreased from about 300 per year from 1986 to 1999 to
115 per year in 2006 and 110 per year in 2007.25 In addition, while there
were ninety-eight executions a decade ago in 1999,26 the number of exe-
cutions has now dropped to about fifty per year.2t 7 Scholars have noted
that there have been between 15,000 and 20,000 homicides per year na-
tionwide over the past decade.25 When those fifty executions are looked
at in the context of the thousands of homicides, it is clear that the death
penalty is a rare form of punishment.2'9
If the twelve states discussed above were to abolish the death penalty,
the Supreme Court might recognize the consistent direction of change,
the fact that more than half of the states had abolished the death penalty,
and the increasing isolation of the death penalty in a few states and coun-
ties. Given that stark situation, the Supreme Court could conclude that




(through mid-November). Those seven states accounted for 87% of the executions na-
tionwide in those two years. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 28.
215. Death Penalty Information Center, The Death Penalty in 2007:Year End Report
(2007), www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2007YearEnd.pdf.
216. Data compiled from Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 166.
217. Through December 1, 2009, there had been 48 executions in 2009. Death Pen-
alty Information Center, Executions in the United States in 2009, http://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-united-states-2009 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
218. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 203, at Annex B44.
219. Id.
220. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens
recently concluded that the death penalty is in and of itself, cruel and unusual punishment.
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1551 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). Though the nation-
wide abolition of the death penalty may seem far off, many death penalty advocates never
foresaw the end of the death penalty for mentally retarded people. In fact, twenty-five
years ago, no states with the death penalty prohibited the imposition of that penalty on the
mentally retarded. It was only after a national outcry over the execution of Jerome Bow-
den, a mentally retarded man in Georgia, that states around the nation began to prohibit
the execution of the mentally retarded. SeeAtkins v.Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002).
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TABLE 1: DEATH Row INMATES IN NEW JERSEY SINCE 1982222
County
Where Date of Status of
Defendant Convicted Conviction Sentence Status Date
Ramseur, Thomas Essex 5/17/1983 Reduced 3/5/1987
Biegenwald, Richard Monmouth 12/8/1983 Vacated 3/5/1987
Bey I, Marko Monmouth 12/15/1983 Conviction Reversed 8/2/1988
Williams, James Mercer 2/11/1984 Conviction Reversed 12/8/1988
Hunt, James I. Camden 2/21/1984 Reduced 6/9/1989
Gerald, Walter Atlantic 5/19/1984 Conviction Reversed 10/25/1988
Zola, James Edward Mercer 6/6/1984 Vacated 8/16/1988
Lodato, Benjamin Ocean 7/12/1984 Reduced 4/16/1987
Bey, Marko Monmouth 9/28/1984 Vacated 8/2/1988
Koedatich, James Morris 10/29/1984 Vacated 8/3/1988
Moore, Marie Passaic 11/19/1984 Conviction Reversed 10/26/1988
Savage, Roy Essex 1/28/1985 Conviction Reversed 7/19/1990
Pitts, Daryl Camden 2/22/1985 Vacated 6/21/1989
Coyle, Bryan Middlesex 3/19/1985 Conviction Reversed 6/21/1990
221. Data compiled using information from Van Wyk, supra note 10, at 7 tbl.1. Al-
though no death sentences were imposed after 2004, there is no data available on the
percentage of death-eligible cases brought to penalty trial between 2004 and the abolition.
See id. at 3.
222. Table compiled from Forsberg, supra note 19. This table was updated by the
author in 2009 with information from Mark Friedman, Assistant Deputy Pub. Defender,
Appellate Section (N.J.) (data on file with Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
FALL 2009]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
County
Where Date of Status of
Defendant Convicted Conviction Sentence Status Date
Davis, Steven R. Atlantic 5/10/1985 Conviction Reversed 8/3/1989
Rose, Teddy Essex 6/12/1985 Vacated 9/22/1988
Johnson, Walter Gloucester 8/16/1985 Conviction Reversed 7/19/1990
Long, Ronald E. Atlantic 10/24/1985 Conviction Reversed 6/21/1990
Affirmed 1/24/11991
Marshall, Robert O. Ocean 3/5/1986 Ne S/24New Sentence 4/8/2004
Ogelsby, Walter Camden 3/18/1986 Conviction Reversed 1/23/1991
McDougald, Anthony Essex 4/4/1986 Vacated 7/12/1990
Clausell, James D. Burlington 4/21/1986 Conviction Reversed 8/30/1990
Harvey, Nathaniel Middlesex 10/17/1986 Conviction Reversed 10/17/1990
Hightower, Jacinto Burlington 11/10/1986 Vacated 7/12/1990
Dixon, Philip Camden 2/3/1987 Reduced 7/25/1991
Jackson, Kevin Ocean 217/1987 Conviction Reversed 4/18/1990
Kise, Raymond Warren 3/3/1987 New Sentence 4/27/1987
Perry, Arthur Camden 5/22/1987 Reduced 5/20/1991
Schiavo, Domenic Gloucester 5/28/1987 Died 1/5/1989
Pennington, Frank Bergen 6/15/1987 Conviction Reversed 6/21/1990
Moore, Samuel Leon Essex 6/30/1987 Conviction Reversed 1/23/1991
Erazo, Samuel Essex 10/21/1987 Conviction Reversed 8/8/1991
DiFrisco, Anthony Essex 1/25/1988 Vacated 3/12/1990
Biegenwald, Richard Monmouth 1/23/1989 Conviction Reversed 8/8/1991
Pumell, Braynard Camden 2/21/1990 Conviction Reversed 1/15/1992
Bey, Marko Monmouth 9/11/1990 Affirmed 7/28/1992
Martini, John Bergen 12/12/1990 Affirmed 2/9/1993
Brown, Bobby Lee Warren 1/14/1993 Conviction Reversed 12/21/1994
DiFrisco, Anthony Essex 2/5/1993 Affirmed 7/27/1994
Vacated 7/5/2006
Mejia, Rigoberto Monmouth 5/25/1993 Conviction Reversed 7/12/1995
Harris, Joseph Morris 5/28/1993 Affirmed 7/12/1995
Hightower, Jacinto Burlington 11/2/1994 Vacated 8/8/1996
Affirmed 8/8/1 996
Loftin , D o na ld M e rce r 12/6/19 94 R eve rs ed P/ / 2007Reversed (PCR*) 6/5/2007
Harvey, Nathaniel Middlesex 12/16/1994 Affirmed 7/30/1997
Cooper, David Monmouth 5/17/1995 Affirmed 8/20/1997
Affirmed 6/26/1997
Chew, John M iddlesex 6/22/1995 A caed /2 / 2004Vacated 3/25/2004
Harris, Ambrose Mercer 3/11/11996 Affirmed 7/30/1998
Kenney, Sean Gloucester 3/27/1996 Affirmed 7/30/1998
(Richard Feaster)
Harris, Joseph Bergen 5/4/1996 Died 9/24/1996
Affirmed 7/30/1998
Morton, Robert Burlngton 7/1/1996 Vacated 6/28/2004
Simon, Robert Affirmed 8/11/1999
Gloucester 4/2/1997 Died 9/07/1999
Nelson, Leslie Ann Camden 5/13/1997 Vacated 7/30/1998
Timmendequas, Jesse Mercer 6/20/1997 Affirmed 8/11/1999
Affirmed 5/16/2000
Papasavvas, Peter Middlesex 10/9/1998 Reduced 2/14/2002
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County
Where Date of Status of
Defendant Convicted Conviction Sentence Status Date
Koskovich, Thomas Sussex 5/7/1999 Vacated 67/2001
Josephs, Daron Camden 4/6/2000 Vacated 6/7/2001
Fortin, Steven Middlesex 2/26/2001 Conviction Reversed 2/3/2004
Nelson, Leslie Camden 3/31/2001 Vacated 7/30/2002
Reddish, Charles Camden 6/26/2002 Conviction Reversed 11/10/2004
Wakefield, Brian Atlantic 3/4/2004 Affirmed 5/7/2007
Some names appear more than once because of changes in sentence status.
*Post Conviction Review
